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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-3-102(3)(i), 
78A-3-102(4), and 78A-4-103(2)0). 
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
Issue 1: The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could convict 
Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the charge of 
aggravated kidnapping, where the evidence at trial provided a rational basis for the jury 
to conclude that Mrs. Zaragoza was not detained for any period of time longer than the 
underlying assault, a conclusion inconsistent with kidnapping. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is 
appropriate presents a question of law." State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 10, 152 P.3d 
315. When considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense jury 
instruction, the Court must "view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the defense." Id. And "when the defendant requests a 
jury instruction on a lesser-included offense, the requirements for inclusion of the 
instruction 'should be liberally construed.'" Id (quoting State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1986)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 252:217-19. 
Issue 2: The trial court erred when it concluded that the hearsay statements of 
Mr. Zaragoza's wife were admissible on the ground that Mr. Zaragoza's conversations 
with his wife while he was incarcerated prior to trial constituted wrongdoing such that he 
forfeited his constitutional right to confront witnesses. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Standard of Review: Applications of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, the 
spousal testimonial privilege, and the Confrontation Clause are questions of law that this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ^  8, 232 P.3d 519; State v. 
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, J 8. 218 P.3d 590. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 89-94; 250. 
Determinative Provisions 
The following determinative provisions are set forth at Addendum E. 
U.S. Const, amend V. 
U.S. Const, amend VI. 
U.S. Const, amend XIV. 
Utah Const, art. I, §7. 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Zaragoza raises two trial court errors: (i) the trial court incorrectly refused to 
instruct the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated 
kidnapping, and (ii) the trial court incorrectly ruled that Mr. Zaragoza's contact with his 
wife prior to trial, including informing her of her spousal privilege, constituted 
wrongdoing such that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
Both of these errors were harmful and require a new trial. -
The charges against Mr. Zaragoza arose from an incident that occurred at a 
Motel 6 in June 2009. Mr. Zaragoza, his wife Christine, and their daughter E.G. had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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checked into a room with a friend, Raelynn Ortiz. (R. 251:109-10.) Mr. Zaragoza left in 
the evening and returned the next morning, at which point Mr. Zaragoza allegedly 
entered the room and assaulted Mrs. Zaragoza. (R. 251:68-69.) Based on what was 
reported to police about the incident, Mr. Zaragoza was detained later that day and 
ultimately charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and committing 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R. 35-37, 251:61.) 
Shortly before trial, Mrs. Zaragoza, through her independent counsel, notified the 
trial court that she desired to invoke her constitutional spousal privilege so that she would 
not have to testify against her husband. (R. 44-52.) Because she indicated she would be 
unavailable at trial, the State moved the trial court for an order deeming admissible Mrs. 
Zaragoza's prior out-of-court statements to police. (R. 70-88.) Because the admission of 
testimonial hearsay violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the 
State's motion was based on the theory that Mr. Zaragoza had forfeited his Confrontation 
Clause rights by wrongfully procuring Mrs. Zaragoza's absence. (R. 75-83.) The court 
agreed with the State and deemed the hearsay evidence admissible. (R. 272:100-06.) 
The trial court based its conclusion on contact between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza 
while Mr. Zaragoza was in jail pending trial. Although a protective order prevented such 
contact during this time period, Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza spoke over the telephone and 
when Mrs. Zaragoza visited her husband in jail. (R. 8, 272:102.) During the hearing on 
the forfeiture issue, the trial court listened to recorded portions of three such telephone 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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calls. (R. 272:48, 50, 61.)1 During those calls, Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza discussed the 
status of his case, their hopes of reconciling if Mr. Zaragoza was ever released, Mrs. 
Zaragoza's fear that she would never see him again, and Mr. Zaragoza9 s efforts at 
rehabilitation—through both therapy and religion—while he was incarcerated. 
(R. 272:65-67, 69-77.) 
Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza also discussed Mrs. Zaragoza9s spousal testimonial 
privilege. Mr. Zaragoza asked his wife whether she "know[s] the Constitution already," 
and when she responded that she does, he responded by acknowledging that she knows 
then that the State "can ' t . . . force [her] to do nothing." (R. 226.) She told him that she 
was afraid about invoking her privilege, and that she was "thinking of just writing a little 
letter," and getting it notarized, and sending it off to "those three or four people that need 
it." (R. 226-27.) He then suggested language the letter should contain about her decision 
to invoke her constitutional rights, to which she responded that she had already obtained 
help drafting the letter from a friend who "got her associate's degree in criminal [sic]." 
(IcL) / 
The court considered those discussions to constitute witness tampering and 
concluded that it qualified as wrongdoing: 
[I]t is fairly clear to the Court listening to those conversations 
that there were; there was plenty of influence; there was 
plenty of reminders of the past; there were offers of 
forgiveness; there were withdrawals of forgiveness; there was 
1
 One of those calls was transcribed prior to the hearing and, at that time, the transcript 
was made part of the record. (R. 217-29) Citations to that transcript are to the original 
record copy. The other two calls were not transcribed until the record was supplemented 
on appeal. Those calls appear within the transcript of the forfeiture hearing. (R. 272:50-
59; 61-88.) Citations to those calls are to the hearing transcript at the point where the 
call audio was played for the court. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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indication after indication that Mr. Zaragoza is changing, that 
he's trying to change, that he - frankly, I think he even . . . 
made some admissions in the statement that, "you know what 
I did" in this case. There was discussion about how he's 
going to change. There was the indication of God or a higher 
power. There was discussion of the relationship. 
(R. 272:103.) Based on that evidence, the trial court concluded Mr. Zaragoza had 
engaged in wrongdoing by procuring Mrs. Zaragoza's unavailability at trial and, 
therefore, Mr. Zaragoza had forfeited his rights under the Confrontation Clause. (Id.) 
The State made the most of that ruling. It presented virtually no direct evidence 
about the crime. Its witnesses testified to their recollections about what Mrs. Zaragoza 
told them in the hours, days, and weeks following the incident. Only Mr. and Mrs. 
Zaragoza's friend, Raelynn Ortiz, testified directly about the events of the evening, and 
she testified that she left the room before any assault occurred. (R. 251:122.) Otherwise, 
Mrs. Zaragoza's daughter, E.G., testified to her lack of memory, and two police officers 
testified about the state of the scene when they arrived. (R. 251:54-61, 62-93, 142-43.) 
The remaining evidence was presented, over counsel's objection, in the form of hearsay. 
(R. 251:68, 91.) 
Because virtually all of the State's evidence regarding the circumstances of the 
alleged offenses came in the form of hearsay, it is unsurprising that the evidence was 
inconsistent on key points. Most important, the police officer who interviewed Mrs. 
Zaragoza in the hours after the incident testified that she told him that Mr. Zaragoza 
entered the room at 6:00 a.m. and left the room for several hours once the assault ended. 
(R. 251:68-70.) This conflicted with the testimony of another State witness who testified 
Mr. Zaragoza challenges the validity of the jury's verdict as well as the evidence on 
which it was based. Accordingly, Mr. Zaragoza does not, by setting forth that evidence 
herein, concede the truth of any of the State's allegations. 
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that Mrs. Zaragoza told her Mr. Zaragoza entered the room around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. and 
remained there until shortly before the police were called. (R. 251:178.) 
The State's evidence was rife with other inconsistencies, but that particular 
inconsistency was crucial to the relationship between the aggravated kidnapping charge 
and the aggravated assault charge. The jury was invited to convict on aggravated 
kidnapping, instead of simple kidnapping, based on assault as an aggravating factor. 
(R. 252:229.) As discussed below, where an assault is the predicate for a kidnapping, the 
distinction between assault and kidnapping hinges on whether the victim was detained for 
a substantial period of time longer than the assault itself. Because some of the State's 
evidence showed that Mr. Zaragoza left Mrs. Zaragoza alone once the assault ended, 
there was a rational basis for the jury to conclude that she was not detained for the 
necessary substantial period of time. Based on that finding, the jury had a basis for 
convicting only of aggravated assault and for acquitting Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated 
kidnapping. Trial counsel requested an instruction to this effect, but the request was 
denied. (R. 252:219.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, 
and committing domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R. 198.) Mr. Zaragoza 
timely appealed. (R. 238-39.) 
II. Statement of Facts 
A. The Events Preceding the Incident 
Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. were staying at a Motel 6 in Salt Lake City with 
Ms. Ortiz. (R. 251:109.) On the night of June 16, 2009, Mr. Zaragoza left the room and 
went to another nearby hotel. (R. 251:109-12.) Angry at Mr. Zaragoza, Mrs. Zaragoza 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
located him at the nearby hotel, packed up his things, and drove over there to inform him 
that she wanted a divorce. (R. 251:176.) After informing Mr. Zaragoza that she planned 
on leaving him, she backed over Mr. Zaragoza with the car.3 (R. 251:113.) After waiting 
a few moments to see whether Mr. Zaragoza was alright, Mrs. Zaragoza drove the car to 
a different nearby hotel where she left the car believing that Mr. Zaragoza would not find 
it there. (R. 251:177.) She then returned to the Motel 6. (Id) 
From that point forward, the witnesses at trial presented markedly divergent 
accounts of what happened. Ms. Ortiz, the only eyewitness who testified on behalf of the 
State, testified that she and Mrs. Zaragoza had stayed awake talking for a couple of hours 
after they returned to the Motel 6. (R. 251:118-19.) Later that night, police came to the 
room in response to the earlier incident at the nearby hotel. (R. 251:119.) Mrs. Zaragoza 
had left, but Ms. Ortiz and E.G. were in the room and spoke with police. (Id.) Mrs. 
Zaragoza returned to the room and then the two women and E.G. went to sleep. 
(R. 251:121.) 
Detective Suzanne Williams, a police officer who interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza Mo 
weeks after the incident, testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her the following: around 5:00 
a.m., Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room; he was upset, so Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. left 
the room and went to the front desk of the hotel; Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza continued 
arguing at the hotel's front desk, so the clerk at the hotel called the police; Mr. Zaragoza 
then left, and Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. returned to the room. (R. 251:177-78.) 
One officer testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her that Mr. Zaragoza "came running out 
and then . . . ran into the car and then fell down." (R. 251:176.) 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
Beyond that point, there are essentially as many versions of events as there are 
j 
witnesses. 
B. The Varying Accounts of the Incident4 
1. Officer Scott Smalley 
Officer Smalley responded to a dispatch call at 12:02 p.m. on June 17, 2009. •» 
(R. 251:63.) After his backup officer took Mr. Zaragoza into custody, Officer Smalley 
and his backup officer searched the hotel room. (R. 251:64, 72.) They gathered evidence 
from the scene and Officer Smalley interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza. (R. 251:64-93.) 
Recalling this same-day interview, Officer Smalley testified that Mrs. Zaragoza 
told him the following: Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room at 6:00 a.m. and, when Ms. 
Ortiz answered the door, Mr. Zaragoza entered the room and assaulted Mrs. Zaragoza; 
then, "[o]nce he had stopped hitting her" he told her not to call the police and not to think 
about running; "[a]fter that he left the room." (R. 251:68-70.) 
Officer Smalley then testified that, according to Mrs. Zaragoza, Mr. Zaragoza 
returned several hours later, at which point Mrs. Zaragoza elected to call the police. 
(R. 251:70.) After learning that she had called the police, Mr. Zaragoza ordered Mrs. 
Zaragoza to take a shower while he began cleaning the room. (R. 251:70-71.) Then, 
according to Officer Smalley's recollection of Mrs. Zaragoza's version of events, Mrs. 
Zaragoza left the room. (R. 251:70.) 
4
 A separate officer, David Malley, testified he responded to the scene along with Officer 
Smalley. Since Officer Malley apparently did not have the privilege of hearing any 
eyewitness's version of events, his testimony at trial was limited (as the State's other 
witnesses' testimony should have been) to the circumstances surrounding the dispatch 
call, his limited observation of the scene when he arrived, and his observations about Mr. 
Zaragoza's demeanor when the officers detained him. (R. 251:54-61.) 
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2. Ms. Ortiz 
Ms. Ortiz testified about her direct experience. After speaking with police officers 
about the incident at the other hotel, Ms. Ortiz went back to sleep. (R. 251:119-21.) She 
awoke later when Mr. Zaragoza knocked on the door. (R. 251:121.) He entered the room 
and she left. (R. 251:122.) She was not present for anything that happened in the room 
during the incident. (R. 251:122, 130.) She returned a couple of hours later with a friend 
of hers, but they found no one in the room. (R. 251:122-24.) Ms. Ortiz and the friend 
cleaned up the room. (R. 251:123.) 
3. JE.Cr. 
The State called E.G., but she offered no detail about the events surrounding the 
incident. She recalled being at the Motel 6, but stated that she remembered only that her 
mom and dad were "in the restroom and [Mr. Zaragoza] told [Mrs. Zaragoza] to wait here 
in the motel and he left and then after that he was gone." (R. 251:142.) After that, her 
mother told her to look outside and, when nobody was there, they left and went to the 
office. (Id) 
Because E.G. testified to a lack of memory and denied making statements to 
police officers, the State was permitted to introduce her out-of-court statements. 
(R. 251:147, 155-63.) 
4. Detective Wendy Willis 
Detective Willis interviewed E.G. in the week after the incident at the Motel 6. 
Detective Willis testified that E.G. told her the following: when Mr. Zaragoza returned to 
the room on the morning of June 17, Ms. Ortiz answered the door; Mr. Zaragoza entered 
the room and began arguing with Mrs. Zaragoza; Mr. Zaragoza then assaulted Mrs. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Zaragoza and, later, forced her to shower; while she was showering, Ms. Ortiz and Mr. 
Zaragoza cleaned up the room with the help of Ms. Ortiz's friend; Ms. Ortiz and her 
friend then left the room to retrieve the car while Mr. Zaragoza remained behind; Ms. 
Ortiz returned alone with the car and she amd Mr. Zaragoza left together; at that point, 
Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. went to the hotel lobby to call the police. (R. 251:159-63.) 
5. Detective Suzanne Williams 
Detective Williams interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza two weeks after the incident at the 
Motel 6. (R. 251:173.) Detective Williams testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her the 
following: after the 5:00 a.m. incident, Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. returned to the room and 
went to sleep; Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. and began 
assaulting Mrs. Zaragoza; during the assault, which lasted for two to three hours, Ms. 
Ortiz and E.G. were "hiding in a corner;" Mrs. Zaragoza took a shower, during which 
time Mr. Zaragoza, Ms. Ortiz, and Ms. Ortiz's friend were in the room cleaning up; Mr. 
Zaragoza then sent Ms. Ortiz's friend to retrieve the car; after sending Ms. Ortiz's friend 
to retrieve the car, Mr. Zaragoza left, at which time Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. left the room 
and called the police. (R. 251:177-85.) 
6. Christine Zaragoza 
Mrs. Zaragoza testified after, and only because, her hearsay statements already had 
been introduced. She testified that Mr. Zaragoza never locked her in the room, never 
threatened her with harm if she left, and never physically restrained her. (R. 251:197-98.) 
She also testified that she had lied to police officers in the past and had fabricated 
allegations against Mr. Zaragoza. (R. 251:198.) For example, when Mr. Zaragoza had 
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possession of their car she lied to police because she "wanted the car back and [she] was 
going to do anything and say whatever to get it back." (Id.) 
C. Key Evidentiary Discrepancies 
A review of the varying accounts of the incident reveals key evidentiary 
discrepancies. First, Ms. Ortiz denied being in the room during the incident and testified 
that when she later returned and began cleaning the room with her friend, no one was 
there. (R. 251:123-24, 130.) But Officers Williams and Willis claimed that they were 
told that Ms. Ortiz was in the room the entire time (recall Officer Williams' vivid account 
of Ms. Ortiz and E.G. "hiding in a corner") and that Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Zaragoza cleaned 
the room together while Mrs. Zaragoza was showering. (R. 251:159, 162, 180, 182-83.) 
Officer Williams testified that Ms. Ortiz's friend left to retrieve the car and that Mr. 
Zaragoza left shortly thereafter, while Officer Willis testified that Ms. Ortiz and her 
friend both went to retrieve the car while Mr. Zaragoza waited. (R. 251:162, 183.) Then, 
when Ms. Ortiz returned with the car, Mr. Zaragoza left with Ms. Ortiz. Both of these 
versions of events conflict with Ms. Ortiz's direct testimony, which was that Mr. 
Zaragoza was gone when she returned to the room. (R. 251:123-24.) 
All of these versions of events also conflict with the testimony of Officer Smalley. 
Officer Smalley testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told him the assault began around 6:00 a.m. 
and that, "once [Mr. Zaragoza] stopped hitting her," he left the room for several hours. 
(R. 251:68-70.) According to Officer Smalley, Mrs. Zaragoza said that it was after Mr. 
Zaragoza returned that she decided she should call the police, that she then "was able to 
call the police," and that Mr. Zaragoza then told her to take a shower while he cleaned the 
room. (R. 251:70-71.) Then, according to Officer Smalley, when Mrs. Zaragoza got out 
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of the shower, she left. (R. 251:70.) This is consistent with Mrs. Zaragoza's direct 
testimony that she was never threatened with harm if she tried to leave. (R. 251:198.) 
And it is in direct conflict with the testimony of Officers Williams and Willis, who 
recounted markedly different stories Mrs. Zaragoza told them in the weeks after the 
incident about what happened that night. 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Zaragoza is entitled to a new trial on two grounds. First, the trial court 
should have given a requested jury instruction explaining that aggravated assault, in the 
circumstances of this case, is a lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnapping. 
Second, the trial court violated Mr. Zaragoza's rights under the Confrontation Clause by 
allowing the State to introduce Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements at trial. 
First, the State's case consisted almost entirely of hearsay statements that, 
unsurprisingly, differed in material respects from witness to witness. Among other 
things, the officers' testimony varied about a critically important issue: what happened 
after the assault ended? Although the jury heard testimony that tended to show Mr. 
Zaragoza threatened Mrs. Zaragoza in order to detain her, that testimony was 
contradicted not only by Mrs. Zaragoza herself, but also by Officer Smalley, who 
testified that Mr. Zaragoza left once the assault ended. Given those inconsistencies, there 
was a rational basis for jurors to doubt the detention element of the kidnapping charge: 
under Officer Smalley's version of events, the detention did not persist for a substantial 
period of time longer than the assault. Trial counsel requested a jury instruction that 
would inform the jurors of the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and the 
lesser-included charge of aggravated assetult, but the trial court refused to give the 
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requested jury instruction. This Court should order a new trial. 
In addition to being inconsistent regarding the duration of the incident, the State's 
evidence was inconsistent in other respects. The State's witnesses could not agree on 
when the incident occurred, who was in the room while it was happening, or what 
happened after it ended. 
These inconsistencies are a symptom of the trial court's second error—letting the 
police testify about Mrs. Zaragoza's out-of-court statements at all. Mrs. Zaragoza elected 
not to testify against her husband. Under the Utah Constitution, she had the privilege not 
to do so. Because she invoked that privilege, she was unavailable to testify at trial. 
Given Mr. Zaragoza's rights under the Confrontation Clause, her unavailability should 
have precluded the introduction of her out-of-court statements. 
The trial court concluded otherwise. Its conclusion was based on its application of 
Utah's forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, under which a defendant forfeits his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause if a witness is unavailable as a result of the defendant's 
intentional wrongdoing. This doctrine was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
approximately 5 weeks before the trial court applied it in this case. State v. Poole, 2010 
UT 25, f 20, 232 P.3d 519 (issued April 30, 2010). Notably, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not apply the test it adopted in Poole, so the trial court was faced with an issue of first 
impression in Utah. 
In breaking new legal ground, the trial court fundamentally misconstrued the 
wrongdoing element of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. The trial court heard a 
small number of phone calls between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza while Mr. Zaragoza was 
incarcerated pending trial on these charges. Based on the substance of the calls—which 
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the court found contained influence, reminders of the past, and indications that Mr. 
Zaragoza would change—the trial court concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his 
constitutional rights. Notably, Mr. Zaragoza did not threaten Mrs. Zaragoza during these 
calls. Nor did he prompt her to lie on his behalf. The trial court's construction of the 
element of wrongdoing is unprecedented and impermissibly expansive, especially 
because it disregards the constitutional status of Mrs. Zaragoza's spousal privilege. 
Had the trial court not erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause, the hearsay statements of Mrs. Zaragoza would not have 
been admitted over Mr. Zaragoza's objections, Mrs. Zaragoza never would have testified, 
and the evidentiary picture at trial would have been materially different. None of the 
State's witnesses could have testified substantively about the circumstances of the 
assault, and it is reasonably likely that Mr. Zaragoza would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial. Thus, the trial court's violation of Mr. Zaragoza's 
constitutional rights also constituted harmful error. This Court should order a new trial 
on this independent ground. 
i Argument 
Mr. Zaragoza is entitled to a new trial for two independent reasons. First, given 
the evidence adduced at trial, Mr. Zaragoza was entitled to a jury instruction explaining 
the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and the lesser-included offense of 
aggravated assault. Second, Mr. Zaragoza's conviction rests almost entirely on hearsay 
evidence that never should have been admitted because the trial court erroneously 
concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights. Those issues will 
be discussed in turn. \ 
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I. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give Mr. Zaragoza's Requested Jury 
Instruction Explaining the Lesser-Included Relationship Between Aggravated 
Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault 
The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that aggravated assault is a lesser-
included offense of aggravated kidnapping is reversible error. As a matter of federal and 
state due process, when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser-included offense, 
the "instruction [must] be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction." State 
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156-57 (Utah 1983) (quoting Hopper v. Evans. 456 U.S 605, 611 
(1982)). In Utah, Utah Code section 76-1-402(4) gives effect to this guarantee by 
requiring a trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included relationship of two 
offenses when "there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
To determine whether the evidence warrants a lesser-included offense instruction 
in a particular case, a trial court must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, the trial court 
must determine whether "there exist[s] some overlap in the statutory elements" of the 
related offenses. Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59; see also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1986) ("[T]he test is whether the elements overlap at all." (emphasis added)). It is 
settled law in Utah that this requirement is satisfied as to the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated assault. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984) 
(per curiam). Here, because the assault in this case was a possible factor for transforming 
kidnapping into aggravated kidnapping, there is not merely "some overlap" in the 
elements of the two crimes—there is almost complete overlap. 
Second, the trial court must determine whether the jury was "presented with a 
sufficient quantum of evidence . . . to justify sending the question to the jury." Baker, 
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671 P.2d at 159. This threshold requirement is satisfied when "the evidence is 
ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations." Id. Put differently, a 
"jury question exists and the court must give a lesser-included offense instruction" when 
"one alternative [interpretation] would permit acquittal of the greater offense" and 
conviction of the lesser. Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, the judge cannot assess 
witness credibility in making this determination. Id. And because of the interest in 
sending such issues to the jury, when a court evaluates whether an adequate quantum of 
evidence was presented at trial, the court must view the facts and all inferences in the 
light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, J 10, 152 P.3d 315. 
Important concerns underlie those standards. On the one hand, this rule protects 
society's "'legitimate interest in the jury's freedom to act according to the evidence'" by 
"permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than 
forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting People v. Chamblis, 236 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Mich. 
1975)). On the other hand, it protects the defendant from juror over-reaching: "[w]here 
one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly 
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction." 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant desires to 
present the jury with a "iess drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the 
offense charged and acquittal,'" the defendant's proposal must be implemented to "give 
the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard." Id. at 156-57 (quoting Beck 
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980)). 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Before explaining the evidentiary basis for submitting Mr. Zaragoza's proposed 
instruction to the jury, it is important to note precisely what Mr. Zaragoza is arguing.5 
Double jeopardy concerns arise when a charge of kidnapping arises from an offense, like 
assault, that necessarily requires a victim to be detained against his will. State v. Lee, 
2006 UT 5, ^  25-35, 128 P.3d 1179. To ensure the defendant is not punished twice for 
the same conduct, the detention must be substantially "longer than the necessary 
detention involved in the commission" of the assault. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
Tf 19, 994 P.2d 1243. A detention that is "merely incidental" to the underlying assault 
cannot satisfy the detention element of kidnapping, or else virtually every assault would 
be transformed into a kidnapping. Id.; Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^ f 27. The detention also must 
"'have some significance independent of the [assault].'" Lee, 2006 UT 5, % 27 (quoting 
Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, If 23). 
For the jury to convict Mr. Zaragoza of both kidnapping and assault, it was 
required to find that Mrs. Zaragoza was detained substantially longer than necessary to 
commit the assault and that the additional detention had significance independent of the 
5
 Mr. Zaragoza pauses here to clarify this argument because trial counsel presented the 
argument in two ways. First, trial counsel argued that the kidnapping charge merged into 
the assault charge. (R. 252:217-18). To find that the offenses merged, the trial court 
would have been required to find, as a matter of law, that the assault could not have been 
committed without Mr. Zaragoza also having committed the kidnapping. State v. Bisner, 
2001 UT 99, If 63, 37 P.3d 1073. The trial court rejected the merger argument on the 
basis that "there is no detention that is necessarily incidental to the crime of aggravated 
assault." (R. 252:218.) Trial counsel then argued, given the court's ruling on merger, 
that the issue should be sent to the jury. (R. 252:219.) The court refused to grant this 
instruction. It is from this second decision—the refusal to grant the instruction—that Mr. 
Zaragoza appeals. 
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assault. Consistent with those principles, Mr. Zaragoza requested the following jury 
instruction on the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault: 
You are instructed that the law does not allow double 
punishment for the same act. Accordingly, you may not find 
the defendant guilty of both a kidnapping charge and an 
assault charge unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
any detention of Ms. Zaragoza was independent of and not 
merely incidental to any assault of Ms. Zaragoza. 
Accordingly, if you find that Mr. Zaragoza assaulted Ms. 
Zaragoza over a period of time, but that he did not detain or 
restrain her for any significant period of time, in addition to 
the time taken up by the assault, you may not find him guilty 
of kidnapping. 
(R. 252:219.) That instruction concerning the distinction between aggravated assault and 
aggravated kidnapping would have explained to the jurors a legitimate basis for 
acquitting Mr. Zaragoza of the kidnapping charge and of convicting him of the 
aggravated assault charge. 
Further, there was a sufficient quantum of evidence to justify sending this issue to 
the jury. Mrs. Zaragoza testified that, during the incident, she was never physically 
restrained, never threatened with harm if she left the motel room, and never locked in the 
room. (R. 251:197-98.) Officer Smalley's testimony supports this version of events. He 
testified that "[o]nce [Mr. Zaragoza] stopped hitting her" he told Mrs. Zaragoza not to 
call the police and not to run. (R. 251:70.) Then, "[a]fter that he left the room [and] 
came back several hours later." (Id.) Finally, Officer Smalley testified that, when Mr. 
Zaragoza returned, Mrs. Zaragoza decided to call the police and that she was able to do 
so. From that evidence, the jury could have concluded that an assault happened early in 
the day and that Mr. Zaragoza left Mrs. Zaragoza after the conclusion of the assault. 
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Had the jury accepted that testimony, it also rationally could have concluded that 
there was no detention or restraint beyond the restraint that was incidental to the assault. 
This provided a rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Zaragoza of the kidnapping 
charge while convicting him only of the assault charge.6 Under those circumstances, Mr. 
Zaragoza was entitled to present this question to the jury. The trial court's refusal to 
grant Mr. Zaragoza's lesser-included offense instruction requires a new trial. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Mrs. Zaragoza's Out-of-Court 
Statements Under the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Doctrine Because Mr. 
Zaragoza's Actions Did Not Constitute Wrongdoing 
Mr. Zaragoza's discussions with his wife do not constitute wrongdoing such that 
Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights. The Confrontation Clauses of 
both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution provide defendants in 
criminal trials with the right to be confronted by the witnesses against them. Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Poole, 2010 UT 25,110. Those provisions bar the 
introduction of out-of-court testimonial statements where the defendant has not had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause that applies when a defendant procures a witness's unavailability 
through wrongdoing. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Under that exception, a defendant 
forfeits his rights under the Confrontation Clause if "(1) the witness is unavailable at trial, 
6
 Or to convict him of the kidnapping charge rather than the assault charge. Further, the 
charge of domestic violence in the presence of a child is derivative of the assault charge, 
not the kidnapping charge. (R. 36.) Thus, a verdict convicting Mr. Zaragoza of 
kidnapping alone would preclude a guilty verdict on the domestic violence charge. Since 
the error injury instructions impacts the validity of all three verdicts, Mr. Zaragoza is 
entitled to a new trial as to all three counts. 
7
 U.S. Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12. 
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(2) the witness's unavailability was caused by a wrongful act of the defendant, and (3) the 
defendant's act was done with an intent to make the witness unavailable." Poole, 2010 
UT 25, Tf 20. As discussed below, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza's 
conduct in this case constituted a '"wrongful act" within the meaning of this test. 
At the outset, it is important to note the unsettled and unique status of Utah law on 
this issue. The law is unsettled because no Utah court has ever applied the Utah standard 
for forfeiture. In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the forfeiture doctrine but, 
because the court found that the witness in that case was not unavailable, it had no 
occasion to consider whether the defendant's conduct in that case constituted 
wrongdoing. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 34. Poole was issued five weeks prior to the trial 
court's forfeiture hearing in this case. Counsel has been unable to find any reported case, 
from the date Poole was issued until now, interpreting the Utah rule. 
This vacuum of local authority is important for two reasons. First, the United 
States Supreme Court has expressly left to the states the task of applying the forfeiture 
doctrine. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 21 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 
(2006)). Utah is therefore free to craft a local rule so long as it provides at least the same 
level of constitutional protection required under the United States Constitution. Second, 
crafting a rule unique to Utah is especially important because the spousal testimonial 
privilege is constitutionally based in Utah. Utah appears to be unique among states and 
the federal government in that regard. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-45 
(1980) (privilege in federal courts arises under federal common law). Accordingly, in 
determining what standard of conduct can legitimately be deemed wrongful for purposes 
of the forfeiture analysis, Utah courts must not only balance the integrity of the criminal 
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system and the defendants' constitutional confrontation rights, but also must strike that 
balance in a way that gives effect to the constitutional status of the spousal testimonial 
privilege. The trial court's conclusion here that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his confrontation 
rights failed to strike this balance. 
This erroneous conclusion requires a new trial. As demonstrated below: (i) the 
trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza engaged in Wrongdoing" within the 
meaning of the relevant test; and (ii) given that virtually all of the State's evidence at trial 
came from these inadmissible statements, that error was prejudicial. 
A. Mr. Zaragoza Did Not Engage in Wrongdoing 
Mr. Zaragoza's conduct in this case is not of the kind that justifies forfeiture of his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause. The quintessential example of wrongdoing that 
justifies forfeiture is murdering a witness to prevent that witness from testifying. The 
cases on that point are legion. Not surprisingly, the forfeiture doctrine has also been 
found to reach conduct such as threats and attempted violence that dissuade a witness 
from testifying. Under what are apparently the most expansive applications, the 
8
 See, e.g.. Ponce v. Felker. 606 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (murdering witness); 
United States v. Vallee. 304 F. Appx. 916, 920-21 (2d Cir. 2008) (murdering witness); 
Hodges v. Attorney General. 506 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (murdering witness); 
United States v. Johnson. 495 F.3d 951, 971 (8th Cir. 2007) (aiding and abetting murder 
of witness); United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (attempting to 
murder, and then, while incarcerated, orchestrating the successful murder of witness); 
United States v. Martinez. 476 F.3d 961, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (murdering witness); 
United States v. Ervin. 209 F. Appx. 519, 520-22 (6th Cir. 2006) (carjacking and 
kidnapping witness, which ultimately led to witness being killed in confrontation with 
police); United States v. Grav. 405 F.3d 227, 241-43 (4th Cir. 2005) (murdering witness); 
United States v. Severo Garcia-Meza. 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (murdering 
witness) 
9
 See Drummond v. Cunningham. No. 08-cv-4290,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139885, at 
* 29 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,2010) (threats and witness intimidation); United States v. 
Basciano. 430 F. Supp. 2d 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (threats); Oge v. Greiner, No. 02-cv-
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forfeiture doctrine has also been applied in cases where the defendant has concealed 
witnesses from law enforcement or has otherwise interfered with judicial 
administration.10 
The trial court's decision in this case would apply the forfeiture doctrine more 
broadly—deeming constitutional rights forfeited on a lesser showing—than even the 
most expansive applications of that doctrine in other jurisdictions. Mr. Zaragoza will 
address two issues relevant to the finding of wrongdoing: (1) the trial court's application 
of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's 
treatment of that issue and is unique in its sweeping breadth and (2) the interplay of 
Confrontation Clause rights and the spousal privilege under the Utah constitution requires 
more, not less, protection for defendants like Mr. Zaragoza. 
1. The Trial Court's Conception of Wrongdoing Is Impermissibly 
Broad 
The trial court adopted an excessively broad standard for determining what 
1199, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22578, at * 13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2003) (threats), Skinner 
v. Duncan, No. 01 Civ. 6656, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10102, at *112 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 
2003) (threats); Geraci v. Senkowski. 23 F.Supp. 2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (threats); State 
v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 1987) (no forfeiture where threats took place during 
commission of crime); People v. Hampton, No. 1-03-0067, 2005 111. App. LEXIS 1188, 
at * 16-17 (persuading witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege where privilege did 
not apply). 
10
 See Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145, 158-60 (1878) (evidence that defendant 
concealed the whereabouts of witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena); Steele v. 
Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1982) (codefendant was a pimp and witness 
was his prostitute; before trial, codefendant hired attorney for prostitute witness who 
counseled her to rely on spousal privilege despite trial court finding that pimp and 
prostitute were not common law spouses; court of appeals concluded that all 
codefendants participated in a combination of tactics that ended in prostitute-witness 
being held in contempt of court rather than testifying); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 
637, 650 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense attorney attempting to compel witness on the stand to 
assert Fifth Amendment privilege). 
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constitutes wrongdoing. The trial court's standard is flawed for three reasons. First, it 
fails to give effect to the "wrongdoing" element in the Utah Supreme Court's articulation 
of the forfeiture standard. Second, it deems privileged conduct wrongful. Third, it 
reaches more broadly than even the most expansive applications of the forfeiture doctrine 
in other jurisdictions. 
First, the trial court's application of the rule is incompatible with the Utah 
Supreme Court's articulation of the standard for forfeiture by wrongdoing. As discussed, 
in Poole the Utah Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining whether 
Confrontation Clause rights have been forfeited. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 20. One of the 
elements of this test is that the witness's unavailability must be caused by a "wrongful act 
of the defendant." Id. f 20. But here, the trial court essentially concluded that any act 
undertaken with the intent to procure a witness's unavailability is per se wrongful. That 
view would collapse the wrongfulness element of the forfeiture standard into the 
unavailability element and would not give effect to the rule announced in Poole. That is, 
the Utah Supreme Court did not announce a forfeiture doctrine based merely on intended 
unavailability; instead, the rule that it announced requires a showing of a "wrongful act." 
Id. As discussed below, that distinction is significant because, in Poole, the court was 
aware of case law from Massachusetts adopting the intended unavailability' standard, 
but the court instead concluded that the federal constitution requires a showing of 
wrongfulness. See idL f 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830N.E.2d 158, 170 
(Mass. 2005). 
Second, the trial court's articulation of the rule makes no room for privileged 
conduct. The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the spousal privilege in the 
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analogous context of witness tampering provides a useful analogy. In Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal witness tampering statute 
that prohibits "corruptly persuad[ing]" a witness to withhold testimony. Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. $ 
1512(b)(2)(A) to (B)). Given the federal common law spousal privilege, the court 
indicated that persuading a spouse to withhold testimony would not constitute witness 
tampering. Otherwise, the court reasoned, the word "corruptly" in the statute would not 
be given the intended effect. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied this 
reasoning to overturn a witness tampering conviction based on a husband's seeking to 
have his wife exercise her marital privilege. United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181 (9th 
Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Farrell, 126F.3d484,488 (3dCir. 1997) ("[W]e are 
. . . confident that the 'culpable conduct' that violates § 1512(b)(3)'s 'corruptly 
persuades' clause does not include a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator 
who enjoys a Fifth Amendment right" to exercise the Fifth Amendment privilege.). The 
conversations between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza should not be considered wrongful for the 
same reason that the United States Supreme Court indicated they are not "corrupt." 
Third, the trial court's application of the forfeiture standard in this case is overly 
expansive, exceeding the breadth of the doctrine even in some of its most expansive 
applications. On this point, three cases are instructive. The first is Commonwealth v. 
Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 171 (Mass. 2005), where the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
adopted the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. In that case, the court was called upon to 
decide whether "collusion" between a witness and defendant constituted wrongdoing. Id. 
at 168-69. The court noted that "no court has expressly applied the doctrine to 
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'collusion/' so the court undertook to survey several of the more expansive 
applications of the forfeiture doctrine. Id. at 169-71. The court concluded that colluding 
with a witness to devise a way to keep the witness from testifying constitutes wrongdoing 
in and of itself sufficient to support a finding a forfeiture. Id. at 171 -72. 
Edwards is instructive primarily because of its contrast with Mr. Zaragoza's case. 
In Edwards, there was evidence that the incarcerated defendant conspired with the 
witness to prevent him from testifying. Id. at 174-75. Although the witness testified 
before the grand jury on multiple instances, the witness subsequently elected, at the time 
of the defendant's trial, to serve a sentence for contempt of court rather than testify. Id. at 
163. Notably, especially given the finding of contempt, there is no indication in Edwards 
that the collusion that supported a finding of wrongdoing implicated any privilege.13 
Given that Edwards was decided relatively recently, this statement suggests that 
Edwards, and the cases cited therein, represent some of the most expansive applications 
of the doctrine to date. Since Edwards, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has addressed 
the spousal privilege in a case where the defendant married the witness for the purpose of 
endowing her with the ability to invoke the spousal privilege. Commonwealth v. 
Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Mass. 2010). Szerlong is inapposite to the case at hand, 
as Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza were married prior to the events giving rise to this case. 
12
 A close reading of the cases relied on in Edwards, shows that each of them is 
distinguishable from the facts of this case. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-60 (evidence that 
defendant concealed the whereabouts of witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena); 
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (murder); United States v. 
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815-16 (10th Cir. 2000) (conspiracy to murder); United States v. 
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (murder); Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198-99 
(codefendants conspiring to have witness wrongfully invoke invalid spousal privilege); 
State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356-58 (Iowa 2000) (defendant pressured witness to 
exercise Fifth Amendment privilege despite grant of immunity to witness and despite 
witness's admitted desire, at times, to testify); People v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 
1004-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (defendant hired witness's attorney and referred her to a 
psychiatrist who assisted defense by documenting witness's claim of amnesia to support 
her claim of lack of memory at trial). 
The witness did not participate in the alleged criminal conduct. He was in the 
company of the defendant in the hours after the crime, and his testimony would have 
shown only what he observed and discussed with the defendant after the crime. 
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Indeed, in discussing the notion of collusion, the Edwards court expressly disclaimed the 
proposition that "informing a witness of the right to remain silent, guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States constitution will be sufficient to constitute forfeiture." 
Id. at 171. Thus, even in what is apparently one of the most expansive applications of the 
forfeiture doctrine, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the approach taken by the 
trial court in this case. Further, because the spousal privilege at issue in this case 
implicated the rights of both the defendant and the witness, as discussed below, 
conversations regarding the spousal privilege deserve even greater deference than 
conversations about a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Edwards is instructive for another reason. Throughout its discussion in Poole, the 
Utah Supreme Court relied on Edwards for a handful of propositions—that the forfeiture 
doctrine has been universally adopted, that the wrongdoing must be undertaken with the 
specific intent to prevent the witness from testifying, and that a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard applies to the court's determinations regarding forfeiture. Poole, 2010 
UT 25, fflf 15, 18, 22. But Poole did not follow Edwards in determining the standard for 
forfeiture by wrongdoing. That is, the Edwards rule permits forfeiture on a mere showing 
that "the defendant was involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the 
witness." Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 170. But the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 
federal constitution permits "the protections of the confrontation clause [to] cease to 
apply to a defendant who 'causes a potential witness's unavailability by a wrongful act.'" 
Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 10 (quoting United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 
1996)) (emphasis added) (internal number omitted). That suggests not only that the Utah 
Supreme Court deliberately rejected the expansive forfeiture doctrine announced in 
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Edwards, but also that it did so based on its understanding that the United States 
Constitution does not permit such ready forfeiture of confrontation rights. 
The second instructive case is United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 650 (6th Cir. 
1975). Mayes and the cases relying on it are often cited for the proposition that a 
defendant's mere "chicanery" in preventing a witness from testifying can constitute 
wrongdoing.14 The conduct that supported a finding of wrongdoing based on chicanery 
in Mayes is far afield from Mr. Zaragoza's conduct in the case at hand.15 In Mayes, when 
a witness would take the stand at trial, defense counsel frustrated the prosecution's 
attempts to elicit the witness's testimony by attempting to assert, for his client's benefit, a 
14
 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d. Cir. 1997) (witness murdered), United 
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d. Cir. 1982) (witness murdered); La 
Torres v. Walker, 216 F.Supp. 2d 157, 166 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (murder); State v. Romero, 
133 P.3d 842, 864 (N.M. 2006) (witness murdered); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 
703 (N.M. 2004) (no wrongdoing where defendant fled the jurisdiction for several years, 
during which time witness was deported); State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 
2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1154, at *35 (Term. Crim. App., Dec. 30, 2004) (witness 
murdered), Commonwealth v. Salaam, No. CR03-4625, 2004 VA. Cir. LEXIS 289, at 
**17-18 (Va. Cir. Ct, Aug. 25, 2004) (witness murdered); State v. Henry, 820 A.2d 
1076, 1086 (Conn. App. 2003) (witness murdered); Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983) (witness murdered); see also cases cited supra note 9. Most of these 
cases cite Mastrangelo. But Mastrangelo considered forfeiture in the context of a 
murdered witness. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73. Its use of the word "chicanery" is 
based on its direct reliance on Mayes. Id. 
15
 The Eighth Circuit apparently came to the "chicanery" standard by a different route, 
relying on the Supreme Court decisions in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), 
and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See United States v. Carlson, 547 
F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). But these decisions are even less applicable to the case 
at hand than the Second Circuit's decision in Mayes. Reynolds included evidence that 
the defendant concealed the whereabouts of a witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena. 
98 U.S. at 158-60. Here, Mrs. Zaragoza presented herself to the court in invoking her 
spousal privilege. Diaz, involved a defendant who stipulated to the introduction of out-
of-court statements believing that some were favorable to him. 223 U.S. at 456-58. The 
court held that he could not, on appeal, challenge the verdict against him on confrontation 
clause grounds because he waived his confrontation rights in stipulating to the 
introduction of the statements. Id Neither of these cases involved conduct of the sort 
that led to the trial court's forfeiture decision in this case. 
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Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the testifying, non-client, witness. Id. at 650. 
The court of appeals noted that "nowhere [did] it appear that [the witness] himself sought 
personally to invoke the privilege, or even wanted to." Id. Indeed, the court found that, 
"[o]n the contrary, when allowed the opportunity to answer questions . . . [the witness] 
acknowledged that he had earlier told the government agents that he did not want an 
attorney, that he wanted to answer questions, and that when he arrived at the courthouse 
that morning . . . he had fully expected to testify for the prosecution." Id 
This stands in contrast to the conduct of Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza. Here, Mrs. 
Zaragoza sought independent counsel who contacted the court on her behalf and arranged 
for her to be able to assert her privilege. There was no finding below that Mr. Zaragoza 
coerced this action, or that the choice was anything other than voluntary on Mrs. 
Zaragoza's part. The conduct at issue in this case is not the kind of chicanery that, absent 
threats, coercion, or actual violence, supports a finding of wrongdoing. 
The final instructive case is United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 
2005), which the State relied on heavily in arguing the forfeiture issue to the trial court. 
Admittedly, given the breadth of conduct that it prohibits and the sweep with which it 
applies, Montague may represent the high-water mark with regard to what can be 
considered wrongdoing. Although Montague bears a number of factual similarities to 
this case, it is distinguishable in critical respects. As in this case, the witness in 
Montague was the defendant's wife, and the finding of forfeiture was based on conduct 
between the witness and her husband while he was incarcerated and the witness's 
decision to invoke her spousal privilege. Montague, 421 F.3d at 1101. Unlike this case, 
however, the witness testified that her husband had attempted to persuade her to lie on his 
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behalf. Id. And at a grand jury proceeding the witness expressed her desire not to lie for 
her husband, but then reversed course by invoking her privilege at trial. Id. Further, the 
witness's children provided evidence that the witness was afraid of her husband. Id. 
Contrast those facts with the facts here. The trial court's decision here was not 
based on evidence that Mrs. Zaragoza was acting out of fear of her husband. Nor was the 
trial court presented with any evidence that Mr. Zaragoza pressured Mrs. Zaragoza to lie 
on his behalf. And the events leading up to trial corroborate the conclusion that the 
desire not to testify was shared equally between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza—Mrs. Zaragoza 
did not appear at some proceedings expressing a desire to testify and then change her 
mind after contact with her husband. Rather, throughout the proceedings below, she 
consistently represented her unwillingness to testify. (R. 44-52, 272:2-3.) Further, as 
discussed in detail in the next section, the constitutional nature of the spousal privilege in 
Utah requires a greater showing of wrongdoing here than was required in Montague. 
In short, the trial court's broad application of the forfeiture doctrine, if not wholly 
unprecedented, is certainly broader than the doctrine in the vast majority of cases. Where 
most decisions applying the forfeiture doctrine arise when a witness is absent due to 
threats, violence, or murder, Mr. Zaragoza was deemed to have forfeited his 
Confrontation Clause rights when Mrs. Zaragoza invoked her spousal privilege. As the 
court in Edwards indicated, this is not the kind of collusion that supports a finding of 
wrongdoing. Even measured against some of the least favorable standards for forfeiture, 
the trial court's conclusion to the contrary was in error. Worse, all of the foregoing 
cases—regardless of how broadly they apply the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine—are 
an inadequate measuring stick in Utah. Mr. Zaragoza has been unable to find any case 
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where a constitutionally protected spousal privilege formed the basis for the findings of 
unavailability and wrongdoing. That is not surprising because Utah is unique in its 
constitutionalization of the spousal privilege. As a result, the standard for wrongdoing in 
this case must be equally unique. 
2. The Constitutional Status of the Spousal Privilege in Utah 
Requires a Different Standard for Wrongdoing in This Case 
Permitting conversations about the spousal testimonial privilege to constitute 
wrongdoing unconstitutionally expands the concept of wrongdoing. Under article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, "a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife." This spousal testimonial privilege prohibits 
one spouse from being forced to give involuntary, in-court testimony against the other 
spouse. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58. f 2L 218 P.3d 590. Importantly, "the 
purpose of the spousal testimonial privilege is to foster 'the harmony and sanctity of the 
marriage relationship.'" IcL (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980)). 
There are two facets to this purpose, though the trial court acknowledged only one. 
Relying on a case from Washington, State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Wash. 
1992), the court concluded that one facet of the privilege is to save the testifying spouse 
from the repulsive task of testifying against her husband in open court or choosing 
between contempt and perjury. Given this consideration, the court found the privilege 
would not be violated here because Mrs. Zaragoza would not be forced to take the stand. 
This conclusion, as far as it goes, is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's articulation 
of the scope of the privilege in Timmerman, which held that the spousal privilege is not 
violated where the invoking spouse is not compelled to testify at trial. Id. Tf 21. 
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But a second facet of the privilege is inherent in its nature and necessary to its 
stated purpose. That is, if the purpose of the "privilege is to foster the harmony and 
sanctity of the marriage relationship," both spouses must hold a constitutionally protected 
right to discuss the impact that the trial, the criminal charges, and the decision to invoke 
the privilege will have on their marriage. It is one thing to say that the accused spouse 
cannot substitute his will for that of the testifying spouse, but it is quite another to 
conclude that the accused spouse forfeits his rights under the Confrontation Clause if he 
discusses the ramifications of the spousal privilege with the testifying spouse. Deeming 
the conduct in this case to constitute forfeiture will lower the bar for wrongdoing such 
that accused spouses will lose the ability to discuss the marital privilege—and the 
privilege's role in the harmony and sanctity of the marital relationship—for fear that the 
spousal privilege and forfeiture of confrontation rights will go hand in hand. This Court 
should reject a conception of wrongdoing that diminishes one constitutional right (the 
spousal privilege) as a means of finding that another such right (the confrontation right) 
has been forfeited altogether. 
In addition, because of the constitutional nature of confrontation rights and the 
spousal privilege, a statutory definition of witness tampering cannot be coextensive with 
a constitutional standard for wrongdoing. As an analytical matter, the scope of the 
spousal privilege and the wrongdoing required under the forfeiture analysis cannot be 
coextensive with a statutory requirement. If all criminal acts constituted wrongdoing per 
se under the forfeiture analysis, the legislature could curtail Confrontation Clause rights 
by criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be sufficient to give rise to forfeiture. 
General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956) (Where an 
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antimonopoly provision was part of the Utah Constitution, "mere legislative enactment 
would not carve out any exception to it [because that] would have to be done by 
constitutional amendment."). The spousal privilege, similarly, may not be modified by 
legislative action. Utah R. Evid. 502 adv. comm. note (noting that to fully modify the 
scope of the spousal privilege, part of article I, section 12 would need to be repealed). 
Because of the constitutional status of both the spousal privilege and confrontation rights, 
whether Mr. Zaragoza's conduct met the elements of a particular criminal statute cannot 
be determinative of whether his conduct constitutes wrongdoing or of whether it is 
protected by the spousal privilege. 
In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the standard for forfeiture by 
wrongdoing that it believed "strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the 
integrity of the criminal process and dissuading defendants from tampering with 
witnesses, and the right [to cross-examination] guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution." 2010 UT 25, f 20. Here, although the invocation of the spousal 
privilege has the consequence of keeping evidence from the trier of fact, that 
consideration could not have escaped the drafters of the Utah Constitution when they 
elevated the spousal privilege, like confrontation rights, to constitutional status. The 
balance here must be struck differently. The trial court's interpretation of wrongdoing 
failed to account for the unique constitutional importance of the spousal privilege. 
In short, the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Zaragoza's contact with his wife 
constituted wrongdoing under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. As a result, the 
court permitted the out-of-court testimonial statements of Mrs. Zaragoza to be introduced 
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into evidence in violation of Mr. Zaragoza's Confrontation Clause rights. As will be 
discussed in the next portion of this section, that error was far from harmless. 
B. The Admission of Mrs. Zaragoza's Statements Constitutes Harmful 
Error 
The trial court's decision to admit Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements was not 
harmless. An error is harmful if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the error "affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, If 18, 977 P.2d 479. 
Such a reasonable likelihood arises if, absent the error, the trial "may well have resulted 
in a different jury determination." S.H. v. Bistrvski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Utah 1996). 
This standard is met "substantially short" of where a court might conclude that a different 
result was "more probable than not." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (1987). What is 
necessary is that the error result in this court's "confidence in the verdict [being] 
undermined." Id Further, given the unanimity requirement of article I, section 10 of the 
Utah Constitution, if there is a reasonable likelihood that even one juror would have 
voted to acquit after a trial without errors, then the error was not harmless.16 
16
 A slightly different harmfulness analysis applies with regard to Mrs. Zaragoza's 
ultimate decision to testify. By the time Mrs. Zaragoza was called, the State had built its 
case on hearsay admitted in violation of Mr. Zaragoza's confrontation rights. Although 
Mrs. Zaragoza was called in an attempt to mitigate the harm flowing from the trial court's 
erroneous ruling, it did not eliminate the error. Rather, in evaluating the harmfulness of 
the trial court's error, the court must "6ponder[] all that happened without stripping the 
erroneous action from the whole'" to determine whether "'the judgment was . . . 
substantially swayed by the error.'" United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358-59 (10th 
Cir. 1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 
(1946)); see also State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) ("If the taint is 
sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict."). 
Thus, it is no answer to the issue of forfeiture to suggest that the trial court's error was 
cured by Mrs. Zaragoza's decision to testify. 
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Given that Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements constituted almost the entirety of 
the State's case, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been 
reached had the hearsay not been admitted into evidence. The State's primary direct 
evidence came in the form of Officers Malley and Smalley testifying about their 
observations when they arrived at the motel on the morning of the assault and about Mrs. 
Zaragoza's condition in the following hours. This provided evidence of Mrs. Zaragoza's 
injuries and the hotel room's condition when they arrived. But from these observations 
alone, there is no evidence that establishes Mr. Zaragoza's involvement in an assault, 
kidnapping, or domestic violence. Further, the State's only other direct witness was 
Raelynn Ortiz—an admitted drug user who testified that she left the room during the 
incident and, when she returned, Mr. Zaragoza was gone. Beyond that, the State's 
evidence consisted of police officers who interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. in the 
weeks after the arrest. Setting aside the components of this testimony that constituted 
hearsay, those officers could testify to nothing more than Mrs. Zaragoza's and E.G.'s 
condition at the time they met with these officers. 
If the State's hearsay evidence is excised from the trial record, there is a lack of 
evidence about the duration and circumstances of the assault. There would have been 
little or no basis for the State to argue as it did during closing argument that the jury 
could convict of kidnapping because Mrs. Zaragoza was detained for three hours and that 
the jury could convict of aggravated assault because there was a risk that Mrs. Zaragoza 
would die during the assault. (R. 252:242-47.) With those gaps in the State's case, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have doubted the State's case and a 
different result would have been reached at trial. 
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At bottom, the consequences of the trial court's finding of forfeiture permeated 
virtually all aspects of Mr. Zaragoza's trial. Without any direct evidence to corroborate 
such statements, the State was allowed to introduce hearsay evidence that Mrs. Zaragoza 
was locked in her room for hours and threatened if she tried to leave. The circumstances 
of the assault were recounted in detail by multiple individuals who were not in the room. 
And although this testimony was inconsistent and, indeed, rebutted by individuals who 
were present during the incident, the jury was permitted to convict based on theories that 
were supported only by hearsay evidence. Had the trial court not erroneously concluded 
that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his confrontation rights, it is reasonably likely that the jury 
would have reached a different result. This requires a new trial. 
Conclusion 
This Court should vacate Mr. Zaragoza's conviction and remand this case for a 
new trial based on either of two trial court errors. First, the trial court erred when it 
refused to give Mr. Zaragoza's proposed jury instruction explaining the relationship 
between the assault and kidnapping charges in this case. Because there was a sufficient 
quantum of evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. Zaragoza was not guilty of at least 
one of these offenses, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. Second, the trial 
court erred when it concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause. Mr. Zaragoza's conversations with Mrs. Zaragoza regarding their 
spousal privilege do not constitute wrongdoing such that Mr. Zaragoza should be deemed 
to have forfeited his constitutional rights. This Court should vacate Mr. Zaragoza's 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are here in the matter of State of 
Utah versus Jonathan Zaragoza. This is case 091904897. 
And this hearing, we're here today for a hearing on 
State's motion to admit evidence, basically the statements -
and I do have a question about that - certain statements made 
by the victim at the time of the alleged incident, admit 
those statements at trial based upon Mr. Zaragoza's alleged 
wrongdoing in this matter. It's a doctrine, an overrule of 
evidence that allows the confrontation issue to be bypassed 
based upon the actions of the defendant and as it relates to 
the, not only the availability but also the testimony, 
potential testimony, of a witness or a victim at trial. 
So, I have read the brief that you submitted and 
I've also read your response, Mr. West. And I have, I guess 
I have a few legal questions that we should discuss before we 
go forward with any evidence. 
MR. COOLEY: I think, I think one matter probably 
could be addressed first. Christine Zaragoza is here. I'd 
like to call her as a witness before we go ahead with 
anything else. 
1 : THE COURT: Okay. 
2 ; MR. COOLEY: She, additionally, she needs to leave. 
3 Apparently, her daughter needs to be at work by 3:30 and-
4 j Oh, okay. 
5 i I think in any event it would probably be 
6 ; appropriate to call her before putting on any, any additional 
7 ', evidence or address anything else. 
8
 : THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. COOLEY: Just step up here in front of the clerk 
10 and she'll swear you in, okay? 
11 ; THE WITNESS: (Inaudible)? 
12 : MR. COOLEY: This is, this is just what we talked 
13 ! about earlier, Christine. 
14 CHRISTINE ZARAGOZA 
15 Having been first duly sworn, 
16 testified upon his/her oath as follows: 
17 : MR. COOLEY: Would you like me to go ahead and do it 
IS or (inaudible)? 
19 , THE COURT: Yes. 
20 • DIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 : BY MR. COOLEY: 
22 | Q What's your name? 
23 . A Christine Zaragoza. 
24 i Q And do you know Jonathan Zaragoza? 
25 i A Yes. 
1 
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Q Do you see him here in the courtroom today? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you point him out and tell the Judge what's 
he wearing and where he's sitting? 
A He's right there.. 
MR. COOLEY: May the record reflect she's pointing 
at the defendant? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. COOLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. COOLEY) What's your relationship to Mr. 
Zaragoza? 
A He's my perfect husband I love very much. 
Q Are you legally married to-
A Yes. 
Q - Jonathan Zaragoza? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your intention - we discussed this earlier 
today - if called as a witness at trial next week to invoke 
your marital privilege and refuse to testify against Mr. 
Zaragoza? 
A Yes, I do. 
MR. COOLEY: I don't have any further questions. 
THE COURT: And you have previously submitted an 
affidavit to that effect; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, 1 did. I think it was two or 
1 j three times. 
2 j THE COURT: That's right. Okay, thank you. 
3 j And now do you have any questions, Mr. West? 
4 ' MR. WEST: Not at this point. Your Honor, but 
5 depending on what else the State intends to produce, I may 
6 have questions (inaudible). 
7 | THE COURT: Okay. 
8 j MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, just one additional thing 
9 j and I discussed this with Christine earlier today. Although, 
10 in light of this, I don't anticipate calling her as a 
11 witness. Obviously, she can't be required to testify. 
12 However, she is still required to be here pursuant to the 
13 subpoena on Monday and Tuesday for the trial, along with her 
14 - daughter, Erica. 
15 i Okay? 
16 [ THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
18 MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
19 You can - sorry. 
20 THE WITNESS: I don't want to, (inaudible). 
21 (Inaudible conversation) 
22 THE COURT: So, and I guess this is what we need to 
23 talk about. As, as I clarify this for you, Mr. Cooley, to 
24 the extent that, well, after we talk about this and after I 














some proffer on, from you as to what you believe the evidence 
may show if we proceed with the hearing today, this 
evidentiary hearing today. 
The problem and the question that I want each of 
you to address is certainly the Supreme Court, the Utah 
Supreme Court and also the United States Supreme Court, has 
recognized the application of this doctrine and of this 
provision of law that the defendant basically waives his 
right to confront a witness against him or her if he or she 
has procured the unavailability of that witness. 
In this case its true, even though they didn't 
reach that point in Poole, it was true that there was some 
evidence and there was some indication that the defendant in 
that case threatened the victim/witness, made some, did some, 
some things that the victim was scared to testified or was 
encouraged not to testify. That, I think, is a different 
situation than what we have here. Here we have the 
unavailability of the witness. Certainly, that has been, and 
its just been reinforced again, Ms. Zaragoza is not going to 
testify at trial. 
Based upon her invocation of a constitutional right 
and also a statutory right, which is a very different 
situation than - or it involves a different analysis I think 
based upon the invocation of that right. It's a right that 
she has, even if Mr. Zaragoza suggested that she has that 
1 right, it's a right that she has and can claim. That's a 
2 very different situation. Her unavailability is not 
3 ' necessarily based upon any action by Mr. Zaragoza, but its 
4 based upon her invocation of that privilege. 
5 I think that puts us in a little different legal 
6 position than where they were in Poole and also in the 
7 Supreme Court case of Giles, and also the case that you 
8 referenced in your, in your motion, the Montague. 
9 MR. COOLEY: I believe Montague was a espousal 
10 privilege case and that's why I think its particularly 
11 relevant to this (inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Okay, so, you're right. The difference 
13 with that case though is that there was some indication that 
14 the defendant in that case had encouraged or solicited the 
15 victim to change her testimony, not to invoke the privilege, 
16 but to change her testimony. 
17 MR- COOLEY: There was also evidence presented in 
18 that case that he encouraged her not to appear as far as she 
19 would get in trouble for it. As well as - this is my reading 
20 of the Tenth Circuit opinion - the mere fact that there were 
21 visits in violation of a no-contact order while he was in 
22 custody. The content of any conversations occurring between 
23 the two of them during those visits was unknown. However, 
24 the Tenth Circuit, I think pretty pre-approving them quoting 
25 the District Courts note that essentially based on that. 
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you've got that wrongful behavior and then her decision, in 
spite of, you know, what had proceeded it to invoke the 
privilege and based I think simply on that the Court noted 
that that could be found to have meet the standards for 
wrongful procurement. 
There, there's one other thing that I feel like I 
should note just because this is a relatively new issue for 
the Utah's courts. And Your Honor noted the witnesses' 
absence needs to have been procured by the defendant. Also, 
it needs to have been intentional that the procurement needs 
to be, have been done with the intent that that witness be 
unavailability, unavailable, rendered unavailable essentially 
for trial, sorry. 
THE COURT: Certainly. And I recognize that and 
thanks for pointing it out. 
MR. COOLEY: The one additional thing - and I, I 
don't mean to interrupt. There are any number of things that 
Christine Zaragoza has every legal right to do. She's a U.S. 
citizen. She can travel anywhere she'd like in the country. 
She can probably travel outside of the country if she wanted 
to. That doesn't mean that if Jonathan Zaragoza buys her a 
plane ticket to Brazil tomorrow, that he has not engaged in 
conduct designed to prevent her from testifying. She may 
have a right to do something. 








Courts phrased the rule this way. The defendant - I'm sorry, 
I want to read it directly. This is the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, "was involved in or responsible for procuring the 
unavailability of the declarant through knowledge, 
complicity, planning or in any other way." And I think that 
that reflects that the conduct itself of both parties doesn't 
even need to have been illegal. It merely needs to have been 
designed to prevent a witness from testifying and it needs to 
succeed in doing so. 
THE COURT: But doesn't there have to be some 
wrongdoing? 
MR. COOLEY: No, the defendant-
THE COURT: - and encouragement to take a, to invoke 
a constitutionally-protected privilege, or a 
constitutionally-protected right doesn't - that's not 
wrongdoing. That's not procuring something that is not 
available to her as a matter of course. 
MR. COOLEY: I am, I guess, unable to see the 
distinction between my example of him providing her with a 
ticket out-of-town for the period of the trial, and him 
providing her with the information and the encouragement to 
assert a marital privilege. She obviously has a right to do 
both of them. I believe they're both constitutionally-
protected rights. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. COOLEY: And there's absolutely nothing that I 
can do to prevent her from doing that. Obviously once she's 
been subpoenaed then the situation change somewhat with 
respect to her ability to travel. But certainly, she's not 
going to be looking at any really stiff penalties for not 
appearing on a subpoena. 
THE COURT: Don't let anybody know that. 
MR. COOLEY: I certainly, I certainly will not. And 
in this case, I think that my investigators have made it 
clear that there may be some other penalties associated not 
directly with that. 
In any event-
THE COURT: But you have to acknowledge that there 
is a distinction between procuring non-attendance at a trial 
in violation of a court subpoena, in violation of a court 
order and procuring or, procuring a right that is provided to 
a witness in Ms. Zaragoza's position, a right that she could 
take whether or not the defendant participated in helping her 
make that decision. 
MR. COOLEY: As far as the rules of evidence are 
concerned, an unavailable witness is an unavailable witness. 
A witness who invokes the marital privilege becomes an 
unavailable witness for the application of Rule 304. So, 
from my perspective, it simply doesn't make any difference 
what the defendant did. Obviously, in some situations there 
: ! 
1 : could be additional criminal conduct. In fact, I think in j 
2 I most of the cases, there's at least the indication of ; 
3 ; criminal conduct, and in this case I would submit that the j 
4 : criminal conduct - clearly, there were numerous violations of j 
5 • the no-contact order. | 
6 I THE COURT: And, in fact, a new case has been filed, \ 
1 \ right? j 
3 MR. COOLEY: Yes. j 
9 ' THE COURT: Yeah. ! 
10 MR. COOLEY: At least at the time of filing there \ 
11 were over 190 of which we were aware, not to include the j 
12 .' visits at the jail. On top of that, I believe that the [ 
13 conduct in this case clearly falls within the definition of ; 
14 ; witness tampering. ' \ 
15 j THE COURT: And I guess that's where I'm going to [ 
16 : need you to proffer some of the evidence because I believe \ 
17 that there is a very big distinction. Mr. Zaragoza, as a j 
13 : criminal defendant, has all the rights, certainly he has ; 
19
 : every right available to him to, in his defense, and how he ; 
20 i wants to defend against this case. One of those rights is, '• 
21 j given that he's married to M s . Zaragoza, both he and she can ; 
i 
22 • invoke the privilege - the privilege goes both ways. ; 
23 ' Certainly, you're not, and I'm not alleging that the marital > 
I 
24 i privilege - he can invoke the marital privilege. But it is a i 
25 <' privilege that is applicable to both of them given that
 ; 
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1 they're married -
2 j So, my reading of the Supreme Court case, Giles vs. 
3 j California, which I think is even a little more applicable 
than the Poole case, certainly, because, because of the 
facts, and certainly that Giles dealt with a domestic 
6 j violence situation as well, seems to me to indicate that 
7 | there has to be some sort of either threatening behavior, 
some sort of physical action. Something other than a 
suggestion that you may take, you have the right to claim the 
privilege if this case is to go to trial. And you probably 
11 I disagree with me in my interpretation of that. But, but it 
12 | seems to me that one, some of the things that the Supreme 
Court said in reference to the application of the Sixth 
14 Amendment and the right to confrontation that certainly, even 
15 I though this exception is not designed specifically to protect 
16 victims of domestic violence, obviously, we all recognize 
17 j that this is an exception that is going to be most applicable 
18 [ in cases involving abuse, particularly espousal abuse. 
19 j But we can't, we can't create two separate 
20 i exceptions - one for domestic violence victims and one for 
21 j other victims. We have to recognize that the confrontation 
22 | clause is, its, its, there's been many cases over the years 
23 i dealing with the confrontation clause and how we think about 
24 i the right to confrontation has been changed a little bit in 







MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, maybe just, just to 
clarify, I could state that - and obviously it's a 
hypothetically - a witness who has not yet been subpoenaed 
for a hearing, two witnesses, one who is the spouse of the 
defendant and one who is not. 
THE COURT: Dh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. COOLEY: The defendant from jail calls both of 
the witnesses. With the spouse, he arranges for that witness 
to assert her marital privilege, refuse to testify. But the 
other witness, and again, this witness has not been 
subpoenaed, he arranges for that witness to just be out of 
town, to be unlocateable. Is - in Your Honor's view is that, 
is his conduct with respect to those two witnesses different? 
Because I would submit that his intent, or the goal that he 
is hoping to accomplish and what ultimately he is achieving 
in both situations is identical and his conduct is 
identically wrongful. 
MR. WEST: The relationship is different. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) Mr. West, you can? 
MR. WEST: Well, you know, I think the Court's hit 
it on the head, and I think that there's a reason for 
espousal privilege. It's a different relationship than a 
relationship with any, any other person- And I'm not going 
into a long history about the reasons for espousal privilege, 
12 
1 I the Court's very aware of those, but that they're not the 
2 j same because the relationship between any other witness and 
3 relationship between man and wife are different. And society 
4 I has a certain interest in maintaining the relationship 
5 j between man and wife. 
6 j MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, the one additional thing 
7 ! that I just feel like it would be appropriate to note. There 
8 i are two marital privileges. There's one with respect to 
9 I confidential communications. 
10 j THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 I MR. COOLEY: That one belongs to the defendant. 
12 j Anything he told his wife in confidence during the 
13 ! relationship, that's his right. 
14 j THE COURT: Right. 
15 ; MR. COOLEY: The marital privilege in this case is 
16 I not his right. It has nothing to do with him. It's 
17 ! Christine's right and hers alone to assert or to refuse to 
18 j assert. So, I don't, I guess I disagree with the Court's, at 
19 j least the definition of it as being sort of a two-way thing. 
20 i In this case, only one individual's marital right is at issue 
21 | and that's Christine's, and it is hers and hers alone to 
22 | invoke. 
23 ! THE COURT: But given the fact that its, we're 
24 | talking about spouses, that's the reason why there is the 















by its very nature, involves two people. That, that's what 
I, I was trying to make the distinction that its not Mr. 
Zaragoza's right to claim the privilege. And, and you're 
correct in that. 
But the reason that a spouse can invoke the 
privilege not to testify against their spouse is to protect 
the, as Mr. West points out, the marriage relationship 
itself. We can't, that doesn't - I know times are changing 
and things, and that doctrine itself has been called into 
question given, you know, cases such as this where there are 
allegations of domestic violence. And we understand, 
certainly, that there are many factors and many things that 
go into abusive relationships as are alleged here. But the 
privilege itself has not ever been abolished and the reason 
for the protection is to protect the marriage and to protect 
that entity which by its very nature involves two people. 
That's the point that I was trying to make. 
MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: So. 
MR. COOLEY: And, and I would, I just rather not go 
into the policy and the history behind the marital privilege. 
But it is, it is the State's position that a defendant who 
persuades a witness to make him or self, him or herself 
unavailable for trial based upon the clear policy of rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing gives up necessarily the right to 
13 14 
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1 essentially object to that witness's statements coming in at 
2 ! trial. They, they've encouraged a witness to be unavailable. 
3 | They shouldn't be able to then claira that they should be able 
to confront that witness with respect to all of their 
statements because the witness is unavailable because of 
their conduct. And 1 think that that, I think that that 
applies in this case. 
THE COURT: Well, and I guess that's the very heart 
of what we're talking about is, is Ms. Zaragoza unavailable 
10 j because she's been encouraged to be so, allegedly. We 
11 j haven't yet had any evidence on this. Is she unavailable 
12 j because she's been encouraged to be so by Mr. Zaragoza? Or 
13 I is she unavailable because she's taking the privilege? 
14 I I see that there's a difference between those two. 
15 MR. COOLEY: Can I rephrase it like this, is Ms. 
16 I Zaragoza asserting the privilege because of the defendant or 
17 j because of herself? Is that, would that be more accurate or 
IS j is that not at all accurate? 
19 THE COURT: That's not at all accurate actually. 
20 I MR. COOLEY: Is she unavailable because of his 
21 i actions because of his actions or is she unavailable - I 
22 I think-
23 j THE COURT: - because of her? 
24 | MR. COOLEY: She's unavailable because she's 



































his actions or because it was a decision reached 
independently by herself, I-
THE COURT: And I don't know that there's any reason 
to go there. Unless there are some, unless there is some 
evidence to suggest that she has been threatened or to 
suggest that she, she better take that privilege or else? 
MR. COOLEY: What if she were bribed? 
THE COURT: Or bribed, or-
MR. COOLEY: What if-
THE COURT: - some other evidence of wrongdoing 
other than the suggestion that she take, she do something 
that she is legally entitled to do. 
MR. COOLEY: What if she was assured that the 
defendant's behavior was going to change and that he - it was 
never going to happen again? 
THE COURT: Yes-
MR. COOLEY: - I mean, I guess I could say I'm 
speaking hypothetically. Would Your Honor like me to proffer 
the evidence that the State anticipates presenting? 
THE COURT: I think that that might be helpful. 
MR. COOLEY: Okay. 








I'm making about, I guess-
MR. COOLEY: - (inaudible)--
THE COURT: - essence, its not to me a question of 
unavailability. That, that's obviously, we're there. We've 
got to that point. The question is, is that unavailability 
procured by the defendant or is that unavailability procured 
because Ms. Zaragoza has the right to do so? And, and there 
has to be, in my opinion, there has to be some evidence or 
something to suggest that it was more than just a mere 
suggestion that she utilize the rights that she has, given 
that she is a married individual going to testify at trial. 
See what I'm saying? 
MR..COOLEY: I, I think so. 
THE COURT: And I know you disagree, but that's what 
I'm saying. 
MR. COOLEY: Well, Your Honor, as far as the 
evidence the State anticipates presenting today and I think 
we obviously, I think we disagree on the, the exact standard 
of the, application of the rule to espousal privilege case in 
general. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. COOLEY: But the evidence that the State would 
present today is that on January 30"- of this year a 
conversation occurred that was, we referenced fairly 
extensively in the State's memorandum. The defendant 
1 : referred a couple of times, I believe, to the conversation 
2 ; that he had had with her. And I refer at the beginning on 
3 I Page 9 of the transcript that I provided. Towards the end of 
4 ; the page there's a little bit of confusion about what Ms. 
5 .; Zaragoza is talking about when she says she's worried that 
6 ; she may never see him again. The defendant responds by 
7 saying. No, what I mean, as long as you know, the plan is the 
8 plan is the plan, and laughs. Christine laughs. He says, 
9 you know what I mean? She acknowledges, yeah. The defendant 
10 says, right, okay, so then I don't see nothing, nothing 
11 . crackin' with that. 
12 I'm gonna skip down to Line 10 on Page 10, 
13 defendant states, "Well, I mean, hey, I sent you, I sent you 
14 info, and if anything ever eomes worst to worst then you 
15 know, you go get some, you know, go get some legal 
16 assistance, and, and you know the Constitution already, 
17 right?" "Uh-huh (affirmative)," Christine responds. 
18 • Skipping down to Line 19, the defendant states, "I 
19 mean they can push the issue, if push comes to shove, I mean, 
20 you can't, you cannot make, so it's not gonna happen so just 
21 stop, you know what I mean? We're trying to move on so just, 
22 sorry, not stop, trying to move on, just leave it the fuck 
23 '. alone." Laughs. Says, "You know." 
24 I She acknowledges she knows. She says she's still 
25 scared because she just doesn't want to get arrested. She 
17 18 
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1 I states that she's thinking of writing a letter and she goes 
2 ! on indicating that she has been working on that letter with a 
3 | friend. The defendant tells her that would be a good idea. 
4 j Tells her to "what he sent you." Then tells her specifically 
5 ; what to say. "I am enacting these rights, you know what I 
mean. And I'm informing you, letting everybody know I, yeah, 
and I" - I didn't understand the name of the individual that 
they reference after that. But he then goes on to tell her 
9 j to get it there before the 12™, this is on Line 22 of the 
10 I transcript. 
11 i And I would, I would like the Court to listen to 
12 | that specific recording because I think that the tones of the 
13 j voices of both of the individuals are somewhat telling us 
14 j with respect to their intents, their, essentially their 
15 ] emotional states and what's going on mentally at the time 
because I believe Christine sounds somewhat uncomfortable 
about what they've been discussing. The defendant tells her, 
laugh for me, twice and she laughs. 
The defendant then goes on to talk about things 
that he wants to do when he gets out and that's a fairly 
21 j consistent thing about the conversations. The only 
22 I additional note that I would make there is that he tells her 
23 j that he really meant it when he told her he wanted more help 
24 I in the kitchen. (Inaudible) tells him that means a lot to 
25 ! her. Says that he wants her right there by me, helping me. 
! ' is 
"To laugh and grate cheese with you, cut onions." This is on 
the very last page of the transcript. 
The other conversations which have not been 
4 transcribed. First, the conversation that occurred on March 
5 19"*. I have a certified copy of the court's docket in this 
6 ! case. March 19"' was the date of one of, I believe it was 
7 the final pre-trial conference. The docket would reflect 
8 that. At the time, Mr. Zaragoza was represented by Bevan 
9 j Corry. There was some disagreement in the courtroom. And I 
10 ! don't know whether Your Honor would actually recall that 
11 i incident specifically, but Mr. Zaragoza made some statements. 
12 j He called Christine afterwards, told her what had 
i 
13 : occurred in court about him, essentially firing Mr. Corry. 
14 I Then they start discussing Christine being subpoenaed to 
15 j court. She asks him, "Should I or should I not?" He tells 
16 her he doesn't think they're going to do anything whether she 
17 comes or doesn't. It doesn't really matter. Tells her that 
18 i she's the only thing they have, and I think its safe to 
19 assume that they is the State, and now its gone. 
20 There was another conversation on, no that was 
21 January 30'', conversation that was - conversation on 
22 February 16" where - and I believe that this may have been 
23 referenced in the State's memorandum as well, and this would 
24 be I would submit, the State would put on evidence 











to two separate court hearings on two different occasions, 
had twice failed to appear pursuant to those subpoenas. 
February 16th they have the conversation wherein 
she mentions to the defendant that they're looking for her 
too because of their little dispute. That's in reference to 
a common acquaintance, friend of hers, (inaudible) calling 
her Angelina. The defendant says - and I didn't put notes of 
this in these notes, but says essentially. So they're in the 
same damn boat as us? She says. Yeah, but not as bad. All 
he did was put his hands around her neck. And the defendant 
proceeds to explain to her the possible penalties associated 
with that particular offense. 
The other things, there was a final pre-trial 
conference on February 12"- that's also, that's reflected in 
the docket. Christine was subpoenaed for that and did not 
appear. She was also subpoenaed for the next (inaudible) but 
the trial was bumped. The subpoena was not recalled and she 
did not appear nor did she, nor did her daughter. Erica, for 
either of those in spite of having been served. 
February 16", in subsequent conversation, and this 
is, this is I believe reflective of the. Your Honor indicated 
wrongful behavior in order to establish forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. This particular conversation, Christine 
expresses some apprehension about what can happen when the 
defendant gets out of jail. She says, "You'll say anything 
21 
1 because you're in jail, you'll say whatever you've got to 
2 say." But what happens when you get out? Her exact words 
3 are "When you, when you're in front of my face, what's gonna 
4 . fuckin' happen?" 
5 I And the defendant proceeds to tell her yet again 
6 ' that he was dead before. He talks about the religion, that 
7 he's changed. And that he is not going to behave that way in 
8 the future essentially. 
9 And I would submit that beyond the, what I believe 
10 is witness tampering, conduct designed to prevent a witness 
11 from providing information in a criminal proceeding, and 
12 beyond the no-contact order violations, all, all of these 
13 communications were in violation of a no-contact order. That 
14 every time the defendant called Christine, he knew it was 
15 another third degree felony to have a conversation with her. 
16 Beyond that there's this manipulation that's going on. The 
17 defendant telling Christine that he's changed; that he's a 
18 new man; that he's not going back to his old ways. 
19 He speaks in that same conversation as well as some 
20 others which I'd rather just not play 190 conversations for 
21 the Court, but questions whether she's forgiven him. Tells 
22 her that he has forgiven her. And constantly reassures her 
23 that he's dealing with his issues; that he's not going to 
24 behave that way again. So I would submit that beyond the 
25 other actual criminal behavior, there's, there are constant 
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undertones of emotional and psychological manipulation going 
2 j on to reassure her and to keep her on his side. 
3 ! The one additional thing that I would, I would just 
proffer and I think that this would be reflected - obviously, 
Mr. Corry is not here, but I discussed this with Christine 
earlier this morning. Christine did appear back in July of 
last year at preliminary hearing. Ke discussed it, I 
believe, at that point. She was aware that she could not be 
forced to testify against Jonathan. The victim advocate from 
the police department was there. Counsel was there from the 
district attorney's office. And we spoke with her and 
12 | ultimately she decided in order to protect herself and her 
13 ! child that she would be willing to testify. She didn't 
testify at that hearing because the defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing on the State's offer. But at that point 
Christine was willing to testify. 
17 j So, something has occurred in-between that time and 
18 j now to sway Christine to essentially - and I'm not going to 
19 j state, but essentially the motivating factors at the time, I 
20 i think that she still recognizes that those are concerns. But 
21 j something between now and then has operated to change 
22 j Christine's mind. And I would submit that based on the 
23 j evidence the State would provide at this hearing, that that, 
24 i that mechanism was the defendant's emotional manipulations, 


















going to essentially run things to get him off on the 
charges. And ultimately, that is what has lead to Christine 
being unavailable as a witness at trial. 
THE COURT: May I ask you one more question? 
MR. COOLEY: Yes. 
THE CODRT: Mr. Cooley, assuming, I guess assuming 
the Court does find forfeiture by wrongdoing on the part of 
Mr. Zaragoza, how do you anticipate - and you may have 
addressed this in the brief and I just don't remember, sorry, 
it's been awhile since I've looked at this. How do you 
intend to get, is it just under the residual exception of the 
hearsay rule? 
MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I would ask the Court-
THE CODRT: - or present sense impression or? 
MR. COOLEY: I would ask the Court to adopt the 
majority rule. The federal, the federal system, and I'm 
sorry if this wasn't clear in my brief-
THE COURT: It was. 
MR. COOLEY: In the federal system it's a rule of 
evidence. Constitutionally speaking, U.S. Supreme Court has, 
you know, first in i?eynoids and now in GiJes, recognized that 
it is an exception to the constitutional, the confrontation 
clause of the Constitution. Utah Supreme Court made the, 
acknowledged the same with respect to the Utah Constitution 







Constitutions, independent of the rules. 
In the federal system, forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
a rule of evidence. It's an exception to the rule against 
hearsay. So in the federal system, once forfeiture by 
wrongdoing has been established, it operates as a double 
waiver of both confrontation challenges and hearsay 
objections. And obviously. Rule 403 still applies. Rule 
402, 401, relevance and, you know, there has to be some way 
in prejudicial versus probative value which essentially means 
that things that aren't reliable are inherently unreliable to 
- and some hearsay is just so unreliable that it shouldn't be 
admitted because it's prejudicial value substantially 
outweighs the probative value. That is the rule in the 
federal system. 
I did point out in my brief that a number of 
states, I believe about ten, maybe a dozen states, have 
adopted similar evidentiary rules. And that's just what I 
was able to find. So, those states had actually explicitly 
adopted exceptions to the evidentiary hearsay rules in their, 
their state rules of evidence. Moreover, the vast majority 
of states that have addressed it in case law have also found 
it operates as a double waiver. There were three states that 
I was able to find which - sorry. 
THE COURT: Aren't those two separate analysis 
though? Analyses? 
MR. COOLEY: Well, the analysis is marginally the 
same because they're intended to, they're designed to protect 
exactly the same interest. The danger of a defendant being 
4 j convicted based upon unreliable evidence. And I think the 
5 | federal courts have made it pretty clear that - the 
6 | consideration given to a rule based on the Constitution 
7 should, its obviously going to be greater than what you're 
8
 ; going to give to some state rules, whether they're the model 
9 rule, adopted (inaudible) jurisdictions or whether your, you 
10 know. New York and you've got to, you go through centuries of 
11 . case law to figure out what the rules of evidence are. 
12 Obviously, a rule with constitutional weight is 
13 ; given greater credence than an evidentiary rule. And so 
14 : because they're designed to protect against the same danger, 
15 . once the defendant is found to have forfeited the 
16 constitutional right, then the hearsay rules just don't, 
17 don't present any sort of obstacle, there's no reason to 
18 apply the hearsay rule because then you're just allowing a 
19 j benefit from the wrongdoing in a slightly different kind of a 
20 • way. 
21 I THE COURT: Okay. 
22 | MR. COOLEY: The one additional thing, like I said, 
23 ' three states have applied the hearsay rules. I would submit 
24 | that California rules of evidence are unintelligible enough 
25 that they should just be entirely disregarded. The other two 
25 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 j - and in all three I was unable to find a single case where 
2 ! the hearsay rule identified subsequent to finding the 
3 I forfeiture by wrongdoing such that any hearsay was excluded. 
4 ! In fact, in most of the cases, the residual exception was 
5 ! used. I've never seen a Utah case where the residual 
6 j exception has been used. I didn't look around very much, but 
7 ! its not, in my experience, used at all. 
8 j So, I think that that strongly evidences those 
9 j states' reluctance to wholeheartedly enforce the hearsay 
10 | rule. I mean, those two or three states' endorsement of 
11 i applying hearsay rules after a finding of forfeiture. My, my 
12 | analysis, my reading of it is that they're essentially saying 
13 | once a defendant has forfeited there should be some 
14 i consideration given to the reliability. But if it has some 
15 ! circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and has the best 
16 ; evidence and the State presented it, it should come in. 
17 j THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 | MR. WEST: Your Honor, I don't know if I, if I'm 
19 ; going to make things worse or better, so. Maybe you can tell 
20 i me just-
21 j THE COURT: I (inaudible)-
22 i MR. WEST: - you made up your mind and, maybe shut 
23 | up and I will. 
24 | But I, one thing that I'find troubling, the State 

















made his argument chiefly, it seemed to me, based on a number 
of other conversations that weren't transcribed. There's -
these are all proffers without any foundation. Counsel has 
taken great liberty to say what he thinks has happened to Ms. 
Zaragoza when she's right here in the courtroom. And if 
there's any question about whether she was threatened or 
cajoled or in anyway pushed into doing something that she 
otherwise didn't want to do, she's right here to be examined 
on the issue. And I don't think we should go based on this 
conjecture and speculation. 
If the Court is concerned about the arguments made 
by counsel, I think that we should put her on the stand and 
find out. 
THE COURT: But she's already invoked the privilege. 
MR. WEST: Well, to testify against him. But she 
could, she could certainly testify as to whether she has been 
threatened. 
THE COURT: Nope, you don't get it both ways. 
MR. WEST: Well-
THE COURT: Either she's going to testify or not. 
MR. WEST: Well, and the whole, the whole reason - I 
know Mr. Cooley doesn't want to get into that, but the whole 
reason for the marital privilege is to preserve marriages. 
And whether that is our cake or not is for the academia to 
argue. That's, in fact, the basis for the marital privilege. 
1 j THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2 | MR. WEST: And the way I see Mr. Cooley's argument 
3 j is that Mr. Zaragoza is damned if he does and damned if he 
4 | doesn't. It's apparent from a lot of these conversations 
5 j that both he and Christine got religion. They're trying to 
6 I better their lives. They're trying to work on their 
7 relationship. They're trying to make things so that they'll 
8 • work out together. And Mr. Cooley wants to use that against 
9 him saying that this is somehow an improper influence by, by 
10 Mr. Zaragoza telling her that he's working on these issues. 
11 That he wants to get better. That he doesn't ever want to 
12
 ; have marital difficulties again. 
13 : So, the whole reason for the privilege, I think, is 
14 ! to keep the State from meddling in that marital relationship 
15 ; which is exactly what the State is attempting to do in this 
16 ; case. 
17 I And I know that we've taken a little bit, and the 
18 I Court is certainly more astute about these things than I am. 
19 i We've taken a little bit different approach then the PooJe 
20 j case. But I think even under the Poole case, you've got that 
21 I three-part test. And the Court's already found that she's 
22 i unavailable. But then you've got to find - and it has to be 
23 ' based on evidence, not on a proffer. The rules of evidence 
24 ' apply in the Court's making this determination, that, that 
25 I some wrongful act on the part of Mr. Zaragoza has caused 
29 
1 ! that, caused her to absent herself. And then further you 
2 I have to find that it was his intent to cause her to absent 
3 j herself. And I just don't think we can get there based on 
4 j the information the Court has or the information that's 
5 j available. 
6 \ THE COURT: Okay. Well, hate to (inaudible) we 
7 ! might be here for awhile. As I've already stated -
8 i and is there anything else you wanted to add before 
9 I, I'm going to sort of preliminarily rule. And then ask 
10 that you put on evidence because as I understand not only the 
11 forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine principle itself, and as 
12 : articulated by the Supreme Court, understand that its not a 
13 : final opinion yet, but its as final as we're gonna get it 
14 ' right now by our Supreme Court in the Fooie case. 
15 "Out of court statements of a witness may be 
16 '. admitted in a criminal defendant's trial when the witness is 
17 j unavailable at trial due to the wrongful acts of the 
18 ; defendant and the defendant's acts were intended to render 
19 the witness unavailable." And that is something that must be 
20 : proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Those - its, its 
21 ; sort of dual inquiry. But whatever. 
22 ; Three, three things we have to look at. First, 
23 ; whether the witness is unavailable. As I've stated and as 
24 ' we've gone on ad infinitum on this issue, Ms. Zaragoza is 
25 ^ unavailable to testify at the trial. She has invoked the 
! . . • 30 
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privileged, the marital privilege, rendering her unavailable 
2 I to testify at the trial that is scheduled on Monday. 
3 ! The question that the Court intends to pursue at 
4 • this point based upon the proffer of information and evidence 
5 j provided by Mr. Cooley and the inquiry that I believe is 
relevant and pertinent, and that is to determine whether the 
invocation of that privilege by Ms. Zaragoza was due to the 
wrongful acts of Mr. Zaragora. The fact, I do believe that 
it is significant that Ms. Zaragoza has invoked the privilege 
herself. It's a privilege that is applicable to her, but the 
11 j very nature of invoking that privilege is a Constitutional 
12 j right. It is a statutory right. It is something that she is 
13 j - whether or not that invocation was at the request or at 
14 j the, at the suggestion of Mr. Zaragoza, I don't believe that 
15 ; that makes.it wrongful. 
16 | What I do believe makes that invocation wrongful 
17 j would be if there was some pressure put on her by Mr. 
18 | Zaragoza. If there were, as Mr. Cooley stated, if there was 
19 j some bribery going on. If there was emotional manipulation. 
20 J If there was a discussion between the two of them, an 
understanding, a recognition that her invoking the privilege 
is going to render the case, the State's case null. 
If there is, if the State can prove by a 
24 j preponderance of the evidence that the invocation of that 










wrongful because its something that she can do, she has the 
right to do - if the decision to invoke that privilege or her 
getting up on the stand today and making that determination 
was caused by wrongful acts of Mr. Zaragoza, then I believe 
that the doctrine, or the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
or whatever its, whatever it is, this, this issue, I believe 
that you could show that the statements are admissible based 
upon his wrongdoing. 
So, I think what we need to do is we need to go 
forward and the State needs to - and as Mr. West points out 
that this is, we do have to proceed by the rules of evidence, 
and you know, foundation has to be laid and whether or not 
phone calls and, I assume there in this (inaudible) but you 
still need lay the foundation and you need to do what you 
need to do to get them in. 
MB. COOLEY: So the State would first call Dirk 
Roesler. Also, Your Honor, if I may approach? 
A certified copy of the docket in this case. 
THE COURT: Oh, thank you. 
DIRK ROESLER 
Having been first duly sworn, 
testified upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COOLEY: 





A I'm Sergeant Dirk Roesler with the Unified Police 
Department. 
Q How do you spell your last name, Mr. Roesler? 
A R-O-E-S-L-E-R. 
Q Where do you work? 
A Unified Police Department doing jail 
investigations. j 
Q What are your responsibilities there? j 
A Investigate and pursue charges against offenses ; 
committed at the jail and also facilitate and act as go- i 
between between outside agencies and obtaining information ;• 
where the jail is the custodian of those records. i 
Q What sorts of information does the jail keep track j 
of? j 
A Besides housing histories and offenses, things like ! 
that, also the recorded telephone calls from - outgoing calls j 
from the inmate telephones. ! 
Q Are all outgoing calls from the inmates recorded? j 
A From all inmate phones that they have access to, | 
yes. | 
i 
Q Okay. And are those recordings stored somewhere j 
centrally? j 
A They're stored in a central server by the company ! 
that we contract services with. j 
Q Okay. What, what do you do specifically with 
1 ; respect to phone calls recorded, outgoing phone calls 
2 : recorded at the jail? 
3 i A As far as how I obtain them or what? 
4 < Q Well, first off, are you involved in the actual 
5 j recording of the phone calls? 
6 j A When I receive a request for phone calls, I am the 
7 i one that downloads those from the server from VAC. 
8 Q But are the calls themselves automatically recorded 
9 or does there have to be some request to record the calls? 
10 A They're automatically all recorded. 
11 ; Q And are they automatically stored on that server 
12 ' off site? 
13 ; A Automatically all stored. 
14 i Q Okay. I've just-put in front of you what's been 
15 j marked as State's Exhibit 1. Do you recognize that document? 
16 | A I do. 
17 | Q What is it? 
18 I A That's a standard request from an outside 
19 | investigator agency for phone calls from the jail, with a 
20 j GRAMA release notification at the bottom. 
21 | Q Okay. Does that request relate specifically to 
22 i this case? 
23 •• A This one does. 
24 : Q What information was provided in regard to the 
25 I requested phone calls that you utilized in -
33 34 
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A For this it tells me who the requesting agency is, 
nature of the offense, what the case number, the inmate's 
name, identification numbers. And then it specifically 
provides the phone numbers that they request me to check 
from. The calls are made, or searched by kind of a reverse 
number, by outgoing call number, not assigned inmate number. 
Q Okay. I'm now showing you what has been marked as 
State's Exhibit 2. Do you know what that is? 
A Yes, sir, this is a disk that I burned based on 
this request. 
MR. COOLEY: Does Your Honor need to see the 
(inaudible)? 
THE COURT: Can you turn it just a little bit? 
MR. COOLEY: (Inaudible). 
Is that okay, John? 
MR. WEST: (Inaudible)? 
MR. COOLEY: No. Yeah, you've seen the? 
MR. WEST: Yeah. 
MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. COOLEY) Okay, so I've put the CD into this 
computer and this is the program that came up. Is this a 
program that's just automatically launched when? 
A It is. A version of it is downloaded with the disk 
when its burned. 
Q Okay. 
35 
1 ( A Created. 
2 Q Okay. So could you tell, tell us what we're 
3 looking at? 
4 A This is a standard (inaudible) access to the audio 
5 files that are, individual files of each individual recording 
6 that's saved on the server and then subsequently retrieved by 
7 telling the system which phone number to search for those 
8 numbers being made, outbound calls from the jail. 
• 9 ! Q Okay. Well, let's go column by column here on 
10 this. The left-most column there, it says at the top. Inmate 
11 ID. Who's, who's inmate ID is listed here? 
12 I A Those actually, those are, as opposed like I say, 
13 system at the jail where they've got a PIN number, these 
14 Inmate ID's are actually individual numbers assigned to 
15 particular phones, banks of phones at the jail. 
16 Q Okay. The second one says. Inmate Name. And I'm 
17 assuming that Line #7 No Pin, is not an inmate name? 
18 | A Yeah. Those actually, if you notice like Line 8, 
19 that first column, 14 whatever 8, they correspond together. 
20 It just corresponds, tells you which phone it was, in 
21 particular it was made from. 
22 j Q What does No Pin mean? 
i 
23 I A It means we don't have inmate pin numbers assigned 
24 j like the prison system does. 









A That's when the conversation was made and the time 
it was commenced. 
Q So, for example, the conversation, the first one in 
that column indicates January 30™, 2010 at 8:23 in the 
morning; is that accurate? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. So that would actually be when that 
conversation occurred? * 
A Correct. 
Q And would that be the same for all of the 
conversations all the way down the column? 
A That would be consistent for every entry. 
Q Okay. The next column. Duration? 
A That's the length of the call. A zero may or may 
not even a one minute duration, there may not be, have been a 
conversation ensued, there may have because sometimes the 
registers dial tones or a brief answering machine message. 
Okay. What's the maximum length of a call from the 
jail, is there a limit put on how long inmates can be on the 
Each conversation is limited to 15 minutes. 
So 15 minutes is the maximum? 
(No audible response). 
And then the last column. Phone Number? 






































the inmate would dial that number from the bank of phones 
from within the jail. 
Q Okay. So the, that was part of the information 
that you were given in the request? 
A Correct. 
Q And could you just scroll down and tell us whether 
all of the calls in this particular report were placed to 
that specific number? 
A They were. 
Q Okay. And what - it looks to me like January 30''* 
is the start. Is that the oldest call on this CD? 
A On this one it would be, yes. 
Q Okay. So they all occurred on or subsequent to 
January 30''" of 2010? 
A Correct. 
THE COURT: How many calls are on this one? 
Q (BY MR. COOLEY) Do you know how many calls are on 
it? 
A There's 276 on this particular disk. It's up here 
on this bottom, or upper right-hand corner. 
THE COURT: Are they from the jail to that number? 
THE WITNESS: From the jail to that one number, yes. 
MR. WEST: May I have just a moment. Your Honor? 
May I approach? 
MR. COOLEY: Yeah. 
38 
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1 ] (Inaudible) 
2 | Q (BY MR. COOLEY) You just did this one today? 
3 | A Yesterday. 
Q Okay, yesterday. So this would be up through 
5 | what was the date of the most recent call on this disk? 
6 | A On this one 
7 | • Q Yes. 
A I'd have to go down to the bottom (inaudible). 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE WITNESS: Looks like the last conversation on 
11 | this one was, there was three calls made, three 15-minute 
12 j calls on May 30'-" 
MR. COOLEY: Okay. Your Honor, I would, I would ask 
leave to just play one of the calls if you - sorry 
THE COURT: So for four months, a four-month period 
MR. COOLEY: January 30'" to May 30 ;\ is that 
accurate? 
18 | THE WITNESS: Yes. 
19 J THE COURT: Okay. Sorry, (inaudible) 
20 \ MR. COOLEY: No, that's fine 
21 ! I, I would ask (inaudible) to play one of the j | 
22 i calls. I think it would probably be appropriate to play the, J 
23 | the first, well, the call that was referenced extensively in i 
24 : the State's memorandum. I think that at this point the Court j 
I j 
25 ' has heard from Christine Zaragoza and as well as from the j 




defendant. I believe also the statements, the fact that he 
is identified in that recording. The evidence in the 
recording itself, given the Court's knowledge the individuals 
should be sufficient to establish their identity, that the 
call is actually a conversation between the two of them. 
I have another witness who could testify that, as 
to Christine's voice. But at this point the Court has heard 
Christine's voice and I think that that would be superfluous. 
He would, however, be able to testify to the dates of the 
subpoena service. 
I don't know whether Mr. West would be inclined to 
stipulate. I have the returns with me, but? 
MR. WEST: I just want to voir dire on the-
MR. COOLEY: Sure-
MR. WEST: - on the foundation (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Sure. 
VOIR DIRE 
BY MR. WEST: 
Q So, the inmate ID number isn't specific to any 
particular inmate at the jail? 
A Not to individual inmates, no, sir. 
Q It's just to a bank of telephones? 
A It just identifies the phone bank, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And can you tell from that ID where the, 






A I would have to reference the master list. I've 
got those - not with me though. It tells me which housing 
unit and even which - cause normally there's about five 
phones, give or take five or six phones in the housing units 
to be able to identify specifically whether it's the far 
left, next one subsequently over. 
Q Okay. And those phones are all in the common area 
of the, of the pod? It's not in any individual person's 
cell? 
A No. These are all out in the common area - the 
housing unit, primary housing unit. 
Q And are you aware as to whether there are numerous 
inmates out in the common area when these phones calls are 
made or whether its just-
A It depends on the individual classification of that 
housing unit section whether, or how many inmates, whether it 
be in the maximum security, only one person is allowed out at 
a time. Where as other ones, minimum areas, its kind of free 
reign. 
Q And you, you are familiar with the, the color of 
suits and how they pertain to classifications; is that right? 
A The only ones I can say for sure is the yellow is 
maximum security. As far as for the blue and the tan, I, 









A - sir, I've been doing this for about three months. 
Q But it would only be a yellow, maximum security, 
that, where only one inmate is allowed out at a time? 
A Yes, sir. Well, there's different class, different 
areas within max. There's where the highest security area 
only one per, one is allowed out at a time. And then there a 
few other levels within the maximum security pod, which is B 
Pod. But that's divided up into eight different sections. 
So they do vary some within those. 
MR. COOLEY: Just to expedite things, I'll stipulate 
that at least in the defendant's current security level, he's 
no longer in maximum security. They are a number of 
individuals that are able to access the phones at any given 
time and I know from experience, that listening to other 
calls, as well as the calls in these cases, that sometimes 
there are, I've never heard of them fighting, but 
occasionally inmates argue over like who should be able to 
use the phone. So, Mr. Zaragoza is the only conversation. I 
will stipulate that the caller in these conversations on 
occasion refers to other who are waiting to use the phone. 
Q (BY MR. WEST) So, you, you don't have anyway of 
knowing by the records that you have pulled who was the 
person who initiated the call, what inmate? 
A The only way I could ascertain that would be to 
bounce it off against the housing unit video and make a 
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or a visual identification comparing the times the 
made versus the camera and time on the housing unit. 
And you haven't done that in? i 
No. I 
MR. WEST: Okay. That's all. } 
MR. COOLEY: May I play one of the recordings or • 
MR. WEST: I'd submit that there hasn't been 
sufficient foundation to show that this was, that these calls ! 


















THE COURT: I think we're gonna get to that. 
I will allow you to play a phone call (inaudible). 
MR. COOLEY: When you say Number 1, Your Honor, do 
you mean the phone call that we've got the transcript of? 
THE COURT: Yeah, that one. 
MR. COOLEY: So this would be the call, at least 
from this record, from January 30'h at - January 30l" at 8:40. 
(4:10:36 - 4:17:55 - CD was played - not transcribed) 
THE WITNESS: Did you want to skip to a certain 
part? 
THE COURT: No. I just didn't think that we needed 
to listen to the whole conversation. 
MR. WEST: And I agree, the Court has the 
transcript. I believe that, I mean I've listened to the 
conversation a couple of times and I just got the transcript 
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1 today, but I didn't see anything that I thought was, was not 
2 accurate as far as the transcript. 
3 MR. COOLEY: Yeah, and the transcript, obviously, 
4 isn't entirely accurate, but the person who did is it largely 
5 incompetent when it comes to transcribing things. As I've 
6 reviewed (inaudible). 
7 Could I skip ahead then to the portion that was 
8 referenced in the motion, the memorandum? 
9 THE COURT: Sure. Let me make a finding though. 
10 MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
11 : THE COURT: Before we do that. 
12 MR. COOLEY: And I would note just the fact that I 
13 believe the Court (inaudible) recognize that is Christine 
14 Zaragoza's voice. Moreover, and I don't know whether the 
15 Court recalls Mr. Zaragoza's voice from previous hearings, 
16 but in any event, she consistently refers to him as Jonathan. 
17 And I think just the tenor of their conversation reflects the 
18 relationship between the two of them. That should be 
19 sufficient to establish who it is speaking in the 
20 conversation. 
21 THE COURT: And this is factual, under the rule, the 
22 pertinent rules of evidence, specifically, Rule 901, dealing 
23 with authentication and identification, it really is factual 
24 inquiry necessarily into voice identification, telephone 
















sufficient foundation for the admissibility of phone calls 
purported to be between Mr. Zaragoza and Ms. Zaragoza. 
There's certainly plenty of them from which to choose. 
I would find under the Rules of Evidence at this 
point based upon my own knowledge of the voices of these two 
individuals - I heard Ms. Zaragoza testify earlier today. 
I've heard Mr. Zaragoza on the record during multiple 
hearings. I am familiar with his voice as well as the 
references that were made in the phone conversation that we 
listened to, the portion of the phone conversation that we 
listened to. I would find that the State has submitted the 
requisite authentication, information that authenticates and 
lays the foundation sufficient that these phone calls are 
admissible for purposes of today's hearing. 
MR. COOLEY: So in light of that I would move to 
admit State's Exhibit 2. 
THE COURT: Is that the CD itself? 
MR. COOLEY: That's the CD itself. I (inaudible) 
believe that Exhibit 1, unless defense counsel wants to have 
it in evidence, it has actually an independent (inaudible). 
MR. WEST: No, I don't believe Exhibit 1 has any 
(inaudible). 
And if the Court's found that there's sufficient 





6 ; . 
7 '. 
THE COURT: But can. And maybe you want to, but. 
I would receive then Exhibit 2. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received) 
MR. COOLEY: And I have no further questions for Mr. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can stay if you want. 







THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I do have one additional 
witness, Rich Montenez, works for the district attorney's 
office as process server. The evidence, and I'll proffer 
this if Mr., if Mr. West would be willing to stipulate, I 
think it will save us some- time. Mr. Monten«z would be 
testifying that he has Mrs. Zaragoza with subpoenas on a 
number of occasions, including on April l*1, left a subpoena, 
that that was not personal service, but he did call Ms. 
Zaragoza, Mrs. Zaragoza and speak with her at the number 
referenced previously in Mr. (Inaudible) testimony and the 
number at issue in those calls. He called and spoke with her 
at that number about the subpoena. He hand-served her on 
February llrf for a hearing that occurred on February 12*'". 
And hand-served her on January 13'h for a hearing which 
occurred on February 17". 
THE COURT: Tell me those days, again. 
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MR. COOLEY: The hand-service - the relevant court 
dates or the dates of service? 
THE COURT: The dates of service. 
MR. COOLEY: January 13:a, personal service. 
February 11th, personal service. And April 1", non-personal 
service with telephone conversation regarding subpoena. I 
believe he indicated it was a couple of days later. And 
those were for the court hearings, essentially be February -
or April V- subpoena was for the last trial setting. 
10 | February 11th was for the February 12s*'' final pretrial. And 
11 i January 13l" was for the February 17u- trial setting. 
12 j MR. WEST: For purposes of this hearing, we can 
13 j stipulate to that proffer. 
14 j THE COURT: Okay. 
15 j MR. COOLEY: In light of that then, Your Honor, I, 1 
16 : think it would probably be appropriate - I would certainly 
17 • rather play just portions of the recording that I feel are 
18 ! relevant. I know defense counsel indicated he would rather-
19 j THE COURT: Hear all of them. 
20 I MR. COOLEY: - hear the recordings in their entirety 
21 : for purposes of maintaining, preserving the context of the 
22 I conversations, the entire conversations. But may I go ahead 
23 \ and skip ahead in this conversation at least? 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 
25 ; MR. COOLEY: Okay. I'm going to skip ahead to 
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approximately ten minutes into the conversation. 
(4:25:05 CD played until 4:25:09) 
THE COURT: And I know this one has a transcript. 
Is there any reference in the transcript to where in the 
conversation other than, I mean, other than for me to figure 
out where-
MR. COOLEY: - I believe-
THE COURT: - where it's playing? 
MR. COOLEY: - the partial transcript that I 
provided to defense counsel a couple of days ago there is -
my best recollection is that at approximately ten minutes. 
It would be somewhere around the beginning of Page 10 of this 
transcript. 
(4:25:46 to 4:29:22 the CD was played) 
MR. COOLEY: And just let it play, I, like I said 
earlier, I think that the last part of that conversation has 
some relevance to what I said earlier about the emotional 
manipulation in this case, but we have the transcript 
(inaudible) defense counsel. Like me just to keep it playing 
or we can just stipulate a conversation. 
MR. WEST: I don't have a position on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we skip to another 
conversation? 
MR. WEST: Your Honor, my only concern with, with 




1 ; complete transcript we have and I have no way to verify if 
2 i things are being taken out of context if we just play 
3 ! portions and I know none of what to be here all night 
4 ; listening to these phone conversations. But I think that's a 
5 j problem. 
6 j THE COURT: Well, how about if we-
7 MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, if I could? And I can 
8 • understand where defense counsel's coming from. These are 
9 all conversations - I have no idea what the content of the 
10 conversations subsequent to (inaudible) April 20:', what the 
11 ; content of those conversations is. That's when the CD that I 
12 had prior to today and that had been provided to defense 
13 counsel, that's when those conversations ended. Defense 
14 counsel's had those conversations for the same period of time 
15 that the State has had those conversations. Essentially, 
16 they were provided to defense counsel shortly after the State 
17 received them. So, defense counsel has had access to the 
13 recordings. I haven't listened to all of them (inaudible) my 
19 office's ability to listen to that much audio. But I don't 
20 : believe that, that that means that we should all listen to 
21 : them together, just to provide context for the portions that 
22 I think are relevant. 
23 : MR. WEST: Well, and I'm not suggesting that we 
24 ' listen to all of their conversations. But I worry about 










conversatio i wi 





















a minute or 
that occurred 
6 J on March 19"'' at 3:41 p.m. I would just ask the Court to 
7 I note that that was the date I believe of a pre-trial 
3 I conference and that would be the hearing at which Mr. 
9 , Zaragoza asked to have Mr. Corry removed from the case. 
10 -j THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 i (4:32:32 to 4:39:45, recording 0319 1541 was 
12 j played as follows) 
13 j MS. ZARAGOZA: Hello. 
14 : RECORDING: You have a BAC. Please take call from-
15 j MR. ZARAGOZA: It's me, sugar. 
16 ! RECORDING: An inmate at Salt Lake County Metro 
17 \ Jail. The use of three-way or call waiting will disconnect 
18 ; the call. This call will be recorded and monitored. To hear 
the call for this call, press eight now. To accept this 















What's the matter? 
Nothing. 
You okay, baby? 
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I'm not okay. 







MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, you said, I know, okay? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, no. I mean, no. I just don't 
feel right. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I know, baby. Okay. Anyway, so 
yeah, I seen Julio and I fired him. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Oh, you did. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Yeah, I went up in there and 
just - yeah, uh-huh (affirmative). You know, babe. I just 
took care of it, cause I'm tired of this shit, you know? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: You have nothing done? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. He fucking said nothing. The 
same shit. Just a bunch of running his mouth. I'm like, you 
know, dud, I'm tired of hearing you talk. You know, I mean, 
I'm doing everything, man, you know? If I'm doing 
everything, I might as well just do it all my damn self. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Do you - can you tell the judge 
that? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yes. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: What did she say? 



























not cool. And she goes, yeah, that's not cool. I go, you 
know what? There's been a bunch of stuff happening. So what 
I'm going to do is write her a letter, like I said, and put 
everything in it, right? All this stuff that I know that's 
went bad, and so I guess I'm going back on the 16'-'', right, 
and-
MS. ZARAGOZA: Thirteenth. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: The fourth, okay, yeah, to start 
trial. You know what I mean? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZARAGOZA: And cause I'm telling him. I'm -
baby, they - it's nothing. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, the thing is-
MR. ZARAGOZA: He had -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Hey? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Oh, shoot. I was going to say. I 
talked to - you know, what's his name? His name - oh, I 
forgot it. And his name Julio -
MR. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Mike. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. ZARAGOZA: And something - he said that me and 
him should go. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
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1 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: I don't know what the hell is going 
2 : on, but -
3 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Tell him - ask him why. 
4 | MS. ZARAGOZA: He just says that he - they don't 
5 j want to put something - how do you say? Cause I don't show 
6 j up? Yes, but I don't have to say nothing. 
7 ' MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, okay. 
8 : MS. ZARAGOZA: But I don't know. 
9 MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, you don't. That's true. 
10 Yeah, that's true, because I don't think that matters, baby. 
11 j MS. ZARAGOZA: It doesn't matter how -
12 : MR. ZARAGOZA: No, I don't think -
13 ''. MS. ZARAGOZA: Cause he can't make me? 
14 ! MR. ZARAGOZA: No. 
15 : MS. ZARAGOZA: Anyways, yeah. So that was today. 
16 | MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
17 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: I was like, oh, fuck. 
18 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: I know, baby. Hey, you know what -
19 \ MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 ' MR. ZARAGOZA: - I just came back and prayed and 
21 ! worked out, and, you know, - and this - but you know what, 
22 ; baby? I went in there, and I made a really good point, and I 
23 ! think everybody caught the drift of that I'm not messing 
24 ] around no more. You know, I told them. Man, like, dude, my 
25 ; family needs me, look at, man, this is causing a hardship. 
1 i You don't get any {inaudible) and I do get it, and I really 
2 got pissed, cause he put his hand on me in court. And I was 
3 talking to the judge, and he put his hand on me and starting 
4 i pushing me towards the door that you go back in? 
5 | MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 MR. ZARAGOZA: Not doing it, but he just started 
7 i pushing me towards that way, right? 
S i MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
9 MR. ZARAGOZA: And I told him, Man, don't touch me. 
10 I mean, in court I just - I got pissed, you know? 
11 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
12 I MR. ZARAGOZA: There's no reason, dude. Don't 
13 | start pushing me. You know, I've got something to say, man. 
14 j I told her, I says, You kno'w, this is my life. You know what 
15 ! I mean? And my family's life, you know? It's not a game 
16 i here, and, you know, people seem to think it's a game. You 
17 ; know, stretching it, oh, 60 days. Oh, 60 days. You don't 
18 i get it. That's a long time. You know, they think it's -
19 j what do they think? It's just, you know, easy? 
20 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, yeah. While they go on 
21 ; vacation. 
22 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Exactly, baby. 
23 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: They do whatever they do, and then 
24 ! you're just a file folder underneath the next. The next one 
25 ' goes (inaudible) and throw him in the dungeon, and there he 
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goes. Start all over again. 
2 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Right. So I'm figuring over the 
3 | weekend -
MS. ZARAGOZA: But, I mean, like what if it's 
i 
5 j stretched [inaudible]. Like what the hell? See, she's 
6 ! getting impatient with this case, huh? 
7 I MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, and then she's leaving. She's 
8 going to work over there with her dad - there on the 12th. 
9 j So see what I mean? 
10 MS. ZARAGOZA: Oh. 
11 MR. ZARAGOZA: Like - well, that's cool, though. I 
12 I think she's going to come back and do - because I think that 
13 | - mine always run on a Friday. So she's going to come back 
14 j to handle her Friday day, cause she's going - do you know 
15 i she's going to come back every Friday to work on her Friday 
16 i cases that she has on the docket. 
17 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: So do you think she will be -
18 MR. ZARAGOZA: Yes. 
19 j MS. ZARAGOZA: - ours? 
20 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative), yeah. 
21 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: Or will they have somebody else? 
22 I And we have to start all over again? 
23 j MR. ZARAGOZA: No, hub-huh (negative). They're 
not. No, baby, I'm not. I'm not - I told - like no. You 
know what? This - I told her. I said, you know what. Your 
55 
i Honor, 
! what I 
this should have been done five months ago. 
mean? Really, it should have. 
















MR. ZARAGOZA: Because I mean, I even told them. I 
go, they've got nothing, man. They've got nothing. You 
know, and he's like well - no. Not well, nothing. Man, you 
know and I know. Look, come on. Stop messing around. You 
know? You're giving this dude just time. Sixty days, do 
this, do that. He's farting around. He ain't doing shit. 
And I go, what's your defense? What are you going to use? 
Ahh. I go, man, that's the same defense you had seven months 
ago, and I'm the one that made - I'm the one that brought 
that defense to the table. What have you done, right? And 
he's like -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Did you tell them that? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I told my attorney that. No. I've 
got to - I can't use all that time in the court, baby, but, 
you know, I put it - I put - baby, you know I did. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Mama, you know, I - baby, you know. 
I'm like -
MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm like, oh, my God. I don't know. 
I'm-
MR. ZARAGOZA: But you could - you know? If - you 















MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm just like. I don't know. 
Should I or should I not? I'm no. Huh? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I don't think they're going to do 
anything. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I mean, no. I mean, if - me, if I 
go? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. No, I don't think they're 
going to do nothing if you do or don't. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, the thing is that he just -
yeah. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I don't think it really matters, 
baby. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Okay. Anyways, God, I'm - well, 
it's exciting, a bit awful. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. I don't think it really 
matters, because the letter - I mean, that's just period -
and I even told the judge that. You got this letter. You 
know, so what - I mean, doesn't anybody look at that? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: But -
MR. ZARAGOZA: And see that that was the only thing 
that they had. The only thing that they had for their case, 
and now it's gone. So what the hell am I doing still here? 
You know, what I'm saying? And they said something about the 
jail one, and I'm like - I'm just like, you know what, that 










were suppose to drop that. Come on, that's 10 - baby, that's | 
almost 10 months. You k 
to be in here. I don't 
| come home. Hey, anyway, 
j Babe? 
| MS. ZARAGOZA: 
I 11 - it's going to be 11 
| MR. ZARAGOZA: 
MS. ZARAGOZA: 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 
j MS. ZARAGOZA: 
j MR. ZARAGOZA: 
•
 t o -
MS. ZARAGOZA: 





; MS. ZARAGOZA: 
j I'm just - oh, my gosh. 
j MR. ZARAGOZA: 
i MS. ZARAGOZA: 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 
now? Shit, I'm tired. I don't want i 
even - oh, my God, Maroa. I want to 
thanks for listening to me, sugar. 
I know. I'm just counting. This is j 
months. 
I know. Hey -
What? j 
- thanks for listening to me. j 
Oh, you're welcome. i 
I needed to vent. I needed somebody 
No, it's okay. I need you to -
I haven't any -
I'm like somebody talk to me. 
Yeah. 
I'm fucking going nuts over here. 
Yeah. 
I've been cleaning and cooking, and 
Hey? 
Yeah. 
I love you so much. I really 
; appreciate that I have somebody that I can talk to. Mama, 
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me, I count too. 
ZARAGOZA: 
ZARAGOZA: 
(End of audio 






Did you know what ] 
Yeah. 
segment played) 
you want to listen 
s been 
I love 
- baby, I 
was just going 
to anym :>re of 
that one? 
MR. WEST: (Inaudible) I think that portion is 
relevant in that recording. 
MR. COOLEY: February 16'h, 8:51 in the morning. 
And I'm trying to recall, I believe the 12"' was the final 
pretrial. The 16™ would have either been the day of., the 
day before the trial was scheduled to begin and Christine 
didn't appear at the final pre-trial or that trial date in 
spite of the subpoenas. 
MR. WEST: Did you say February 16th? 
MR. COOLEY: February 16". 
MR. WEST: At 8:52? 
MR. COOLEY: 8:52, that's the time. 
And were those dates correct? February 12™ was the 





















MR. WEST: I don't have my file on that. 
THE COURT: We had a scheduling conference on the 
17™ and then-
MR. COOLEY: - it was (inaudible)— 
THE COURT: - the final pretrial was on the 12"'. 
MR. COOLEY: Right. But the 17th was initially the 
trial. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. COOLEY: Christine was subpoenaed for both the 
final pretrial on the 12™ (inaudible). I guess I could 
elaborate a little bit further and this, this is I guess just 
outside of Mr. West's experience with the case. But on 
approximately February 8, Mr. Corry came to me. Both of us 
approached Your Honor regarding the appointment of counsel 
for Christine. I objected. And Jeff Hall was appointed to 
represent Christine. He filed-
THE COURT: A limited purpose. 
MR. COOLEY: Exactly. He filed the motion as well 
as the affidavit which Christine had signed on the 4'-l:, it 
was notarized on the 5". And as I noted in my memorandum, 
those, the conversation we listened to in the very beginning 
was on January 30™ wherein they discuss exactly those 
things, getting an attorney and submitting the affidavit to 



















transcript reflects, but. 
So this would have been the day, four days after 
the final pre-trial conference when the trial was stricken 
and then it was set for a scheduling conference. And then 
the day before what I believe would have been the second time 
that Christine failed to appear pursuant to the subpoena. 
2-16 (4:42:36 to 4:43:04 the CD was played) 
0216 0852 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Hello. 
RECORDING: You have a BAC. Please take call from-
MR. ZARAGOZA: It's me, baby. 
RECORDING: - an inmate at Salt Lake County Metro 
Jail. The use of three-way or call waiting will disconnect 
the call. This call will be recorded and monitored. To hear 
the cost of this call, press eight now. To accept this call, 
press five now. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Hello. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Hi, sugar. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Hi. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: How you doing, baby? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: All right. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: You okay? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: No. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? 












































Hey, I love you. 
I love you too. 
Did you get a call this morning? 
No. 
Oh, not yet? Okay. I thought -
No, but the car's gone. 
They repoed it? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
They found out where it was -
Did you? 
(Audio stopped) 
MR. COOLEY: That's submitted to -
(Audio played) 
MR. ZARAGOZA: - come out this morning? 
(Audio stopped) 
MR. COOLEY: -about two minutes and 4 0 seconds. 
(Audio started) 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: (Inaudible) money out [inaudible] 
(Audio stopped) 
MR. ?: (Inaudible). 
(Audio started) 
MR. ZARAGOZA: - 4:30 this morning. (Inaudible). 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, I did. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, did she go to the bus stop? 
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1 • MS. ZARAGOZA: (Inaudible). 
2 I MR. ZARAGOZA: How did she get there? 
3 | MS. ZARAGOZA: I took her. 
4 ! (Audio stopped) 
5 i (Inaudible from courtroom) 
6 i (Audio started) 
7 MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, they let you use it? 
8 j (Audio stopped) 
9 | THE COURT: Do you want to just listen? 
i 
10 ! MR. ?: That's fine. 
11 j (Audio started) 
12 j MS. ZARAGOZA: No, I (inaudible). 
13 ! MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, okay, got yeah. 
14 ; (Audio stopped) 
I 
15 i MR. WEST: Sorry? 
I 
16 ! THE COURT: Do you want him to skip ahead or do you 
17 : want to just listen? 
18 i MR. COOLEY: Sorry, I have skipped ahead. 
19 \ THE COURT: Oh, you did? Okay. 
20 | MR. COOLEY: If we want to skip back. At this point 
21 , they're talking -
22 • THE COURT: No. 
23 i MR. COOLEY: -about - this is something I mentioned 
early, they're talking about Angelina. We don't know who 








































COURT: No , that's fine. 

























didn't realize you had already skipped | 
recording) j 
(Inaudible). j 
They let you use it? | 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
That's nice. 
No, Angelina stayed there. 
Oh, okay, got yeah. j 
Because they're looking for her too. i 
They are? ! 
Uh-huh (affirmative). Because they're j 
Oh, God. So she's - so she's now 















Ah, yeah, but not as bad. 
All right. 
Yeah, not as bad. 
Hey, just tell her this, look to 
t even fuckin' go, babe, that's it -
done, yeah know? You know what I 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
1 ! MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
2 • MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, yeah, it's not hardly even that 
3 i big of a deal because he just grabbed her by the throat and 
4 ! scratched my face, but yeah, (inaudible) been there. 
5 | MR. ZARAGOZA: It's still like a fuckin' zero to 
6 j five, zero to five or one - I think it's a one to 15, 
7 actually, but I mean you could get it lowered, you know. I 
8 ; don't know. Yeah? 
9 MS. ZARAGOZA: I don't know. 
10 MR. ZARAGOZA: I mean, that's what I'm trying. I'm 
11 i going to call what's his name right now in a minute - in a 
12 • little bit and see what's up. I was suppose to - I thought 
13 j to get a visit today, you know? I'll see what happens. 
14 So what's up, sugar. Talk to me. Mama. 
15 | MS. ZARAGOZA: Nothing. 
16 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: Are you still mad? 
17 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm just -
18 i MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? 
19 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm just - I'm here. 
20 : MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, okay. I just wanted to make 
21 ! sure you're not mad, you know? I'm not - hey, -
22 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: - I'm not mad. I'm really not mad. 
24 ! You know, I went in and just prayed and stuff. You know what 














Yeah. You know what I mean? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
I think you need to focus on that 
more. Have you been reading your Bible and stuff, baby? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: It's been a while. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Have you been reading your Bible and 
stuff? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I've been reading the women's thing, 
but not really. I haven't. I've just been - I don't know. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 'Cause, I really wish you would, you 
know? (Inaudible) been talking about God and stuff. You 
don't know that much any more. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Not today, I haven't. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. And, you know, I mean that's 
how we slip, baby. You know what I mean? That's how he gets 
in our head. You know that? Seriously, think about it. 
Mama. You know, I've been there all morning, cause I just 
don't even - huh-huh (negative). I'm not letting none of 
that in my head, you know. There's been enough of all of 
that, right? Huh? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I know. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, you know. I was reading - oh, 
you know, what I read this morning? I was reading - shit, 
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1 I I'm going to tell you. I'm going to have to show - I'm going 
2 j to read it to you when I call you later, but I was reading it 
3 i this morning. Oh, it says I'm not thinking of the things of 
4 ! the past. I keep my eyes on the future and things to come. 
5 I You know what I mean? That's -
6 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
7 J MR. ZARAGOZA: You know what I mean? 
8 j MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm like scared something else is 
9 j going - hello. 
10 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: But he's talking about the prize, 
11 ! baby. You know what I mean? He's talking about the prize, 
12 I you know? He says I'm not thinking of the things of the 
13 | past. I keep my eyes on the future and things to come. You 
14 ; know what I mean? 
15 ! (Audio stopped) 
16 | MR. COOLEY: I did rewind that. 
17 j (Audio started) 
18 j MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
19 j MR. ZARAGOZA: But he's talking about the prize, 
20 i baby. I mean he's talking about the prize. You've got to 
21 | keep your - you've got to keep - you've got to - remember 
22 j what I was telling you once you know about it you've got to 
23 | be like really carefully. 
24 | MS. ZARAGOZA: I know, but I've been waiting. 















don't want to wait. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 
I'm not that - baby, I' 
about, you know, your -





I don't want to wait anymore. I 
I know that, but no, that's fine. 
ra not talking about that. I'm talking 
you know, your walk with God. You 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
I'm talking about that. I mean, you 
11 j don't have to wait for that. You've got - you can have that 
12 ! right now. You know what I mean? 
13 I MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
14 j MR. ZARAGOZA: You don't have to wait for it. It's 
15 j yours, but just don't - once you do know about it, you know, 
I 
16 ; you've got be really careful, because now you know. You 
17 know? And I'm sure that you've heard that in church, and I'm 
18 ' just explaining it to you too. You know, that now you know 
19 so you've got to be more careful, you know? I mean, I know 
20 that - I'm - shit, I'm lucky, you know what I mean? Cause I 
21 wasn't careful, but you know once you know -
22 i MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, but you know already. You 
23 ! knew for a long time. 
24 i MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 














- kept doing it, and - you know what 
Yeah, because -





mean, I just barely found it, and you already knew it. And 
so I mean - do you understand what I'm saying? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: And that's why I - yes. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I mean, that's what scared me, cause 
like, okay, you could say one thing now, but -
MR. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. ZARAGOZA: - you already knew before - way 












MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay, exactly, and -
MS. ZARAGOZA: And so that's what worries me. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, okay. I understand that, and 
you know what, and you should be worried about that if that's 
something that concerns you. I understand that. Baby, I'm 
not tripping on me, okay? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). I am. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I know, but. Mama, I'm talking about 
you. You know, regardless of what happens to me, I want to 
make sure that you - you know what I'm saying? I mean, 
that's really something important to me. I've been telling 
1 you that from the beginning, and I just want you -
2 I MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, that's why - that's why. 
3 Yeah, cause I am thinking about myself. 
4 MR. ZARAGOZA: You know, I really want you -
.5 | MS. ZARAGOZA: Cause I'm always thinking about 
6 everybody else, and I'm -
7 MR. ZARAGOZA: Then think about yourself, baby, you 
8 know? 
9 MS. ZARAGOZA: You know, I've got to think what's 
10 good for me too. 
11 MR. ZARAGOZA: Exactly. Think what's good for you. 
12 Shit, exactly. You should. You know, I've been telling you 
13 that. I haven't told you nothing different, you know? I 
14 haven't, have I? 
15 MS. ZARAGOZA: No. 
16 MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? 
17 : MS. ZARAGOZA: No. 
18 MR. ZARAGOZA: You know, I've been - I've told you 
19 - hey, you know what? All I - the main thing for me is I 
20 just want you to be happy, and you know what? I want you to 
21 stay focused, and I'll - I mean, it's so important to me that 
22 you stay focused on God, because you know what, baby? I'm 
23 going to tell you again. I'm lucky. And you know what? 
24 That's fine. Whatever happens to me, happens to me. But you 
25 : know what? I'm lucky. At least I know - you know, cause I 
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1 f died, and I came back. And you know what? If I wouldn't 
2 i have came back, I'd have went straight to hell. And you know 
3 i what? I got lucky, and I got another chance. And you know 
I 
4 \ what? I ain't screwing it up - and exactly for nobody. 
5 | Nobody. You know what I mean? I'm not going to hell for 
6 i anybody. Anybody. 
7 | MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
8 | MR. ZARAGOZA: You know what I'm saying? 
I 
9 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 ! MR. ZARAGOZA: I'm not doing it. You know? Huh-
11 I huh (negative). You know, that's why I'm doing all this 
12 ! stuff that I am doing, period. Not doing that - I'm doing it 
13 : so that if the possibility be - if I do get out of here, then 
14 • I've got a little head start on what I need to do. You know 
15 ; what I mean? Going back to counseling and things like that, 
I 
16 I you know? Because it's not going to just happen over night, 
17 i you know what I mean? 
18 : MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
19 : MR. ZARAGOZA: I've been learning - I've been 
20 learning - I mean, I am the way I am, because, you know, I'm 
21 a product of what was - what I was made to be, and that's not 
22 a copout. That - and I'm not playing a pity party. That 
23 doesn't say, oh, I'm the victim. No, but what I do want to 
24 do is I do want to change that. You know what I mean? 
25 MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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MR. ZARAGOZA: I do want to make it different, you 
know? I mean, shit, look at all the time I've done. All the 
time I've done. All the prison. All that. Look, I've never 
went to any counseling. Never had any programs. Never got 
any type of rehabilitation other than just going to prison, 
right? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Right? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yes. So -
MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I mean, you already said. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. So I mean, but now - you 
know, now that I've realized, well, there are things that I 
can do -
{Audio stopped) 
MR. COOLEY: I'd like to {inaudible] that into the 
next conversation. 
MR. WEST: It was just getting good. 
MR. COOLEY: Would you like me to keep playing that? 
THE COURT: I would. I would. 
MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: Is there much more? 
(Overlapping audio with courtroom) 
MR. COOLEY: Well, sort of a preview of - this, both 
conversations - well, both conversations are 15 minutes long 
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1 \ and we're ten and a half minutes into this conversation and 
2 ' the next conversation is initiated immediately after the jail 
3 • phone system cuts them off. 
4 : THE COURT: Because it cuts them off at 15 minutes. 
5 ! MR. COOLEY: At 15 minutes. So it's essentially the j 
6 j same conversation, it's just the next call. i 
7 • THE COURT: Let's listen just a bit more. ! 
8 •; MR. COOLEY: Okay. ! 
9 THE COURT: - as to this. 
10 ; (Audio resumed) 
11 MR. ZARAGOZA: - I have to initiate it and take the I 
12 steps, and it's not going to just happen - boom. You know j 
i 
13 what I mean? I've got to work at it, which I have been, you j 
14 ; know? I mean, I've really been - shit, man. I'm going ' 
15 through some really shit - heavy shit right now. You know, ! 
16 I'm going with John about, you know, me being molested, and ; 
17 ; fucking, all that crap. You know what I mean? j 
13
 i MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). j 
19 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: That I've never dealt with, you know? j 
20 ' You know what I mean? I 
21 j MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). j 
22 MR. ZARAGOZA: And it's hard for me. I mean, shit, j 
23 you know. I mean, you know, and I wish that I could have ' 
talked to you about it, you know? It would have been cool, j 
you know? And it just - I just had it all bottled up, and I 
73 ! 
10 | 
1 1 I 
I 















just - I couldn't talk to anybody about it. You know what I 
mean? And I'm just fricking tired of people - just the same 
as you, and I'm not playing pity party. Like I said, I want 
to change it. I'm just tired of people fucking hurting me. 
I'm tired of it. You know what I mean? I am - I was just 
tired of it. You know, the people, like I said, when I was 
growing up, they -
MS. ZARAGOZA: But I didn't hurt you, though. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: - you think - the people that you 
think love you are the ones that screw you over, you know, 
and so I'm just like - I don't know. And that was my 
mentality of thinking, and I know it's wrong. I need to 
change that. So that's what I'm trying to work on. You know 
what I mean? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZARAGOZA: But it's not easy, and I'm sure 
you're the same way, because you had a lot of stuff happen to 
you. You know what I mean? And I'm sure you're tired of it 
too, you know what I mean? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZARAGOZA: So you're like, screw you, you know? 
I'm sure that goes through your mind. I'm almost positive it 
is cause - or it does, because I told you. I'm digging into 
shit that I really didn't even know I - I totally like forgot 
about it. You know what I mean? It's like I never really 
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1 i even really - it never even popped up in my mind at all. It 
2 ; was like kind of not even a memory. Do you have stuff like 
3 j that? 
4 i MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Like my whole childhood. I 
5 | don't-
6 i MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Well, I mean, I can't -
7 [ MS. ZARAGOZA: But, you know, I - yeah. 
8 | MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, I mean I tried, but I can't 
9 ! remember for like - almost like five or six. I can't 
10 \ remember-
11 ' (Audio stopped) 
12 | MR. COOLEY: So this would be February 16th at 9:07. 
13 ; And like I said, it's a continuation of the last - of the 
14 ! conversation that we were just listening to. 
15 ; (Audio plays 0216 0907} 
16 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: - and you really - put it this way. 
17 ; What would it take to prove to you that I love you? Would 
18 I you - okay. Just say this for instance. Say I went away for 
19 ; a while just to prove that, would you believe it? If I just 
20 : said, okay, fine. Boom. And I - would you believe it then? 
21 I MS. ZARAGOZA: Arid you made - made sure you're -
22 | oh, yeah. I would, probably. I want you to make yourself 
23 ! right before, you know -
24 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
25 | MS. ZARAGOZA: To make sure, you know. 
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1 1 MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. 
2 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: I don't want us to just jump into it 
3 again, and then like, wait a minute. 
4 MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, that's what - I mean, that's 
5 what I've been trying - I mean, that's what I've been trying 
6 to plan, you know? I want to go to counseling and stuff. I 
7 still want to go work with Isaac to that trailer. You know 
3 : what I mean? 
9 * MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 '• MR. ZARAGOZA: I mean, I've been doing what I can 
11 in here to do that. I mean, are you doing some of that? 
12 : MS. ZARAGOZA: No, I'm not. 
13 | MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay. You know, I wish you would. 
14 | MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, I know, but I mean are you 
15 j going to pay for it? 
16 , MR. ZARAGOZA: Sure, baby, if I can. No, baby, I -
17 ; no. 
18 I MS. ZARAGOZA: You know, I mean, you're not having 
19 \ to worry about anything in there, because you don't - you're 
20 ' - I mean, you know, it's there. 
21 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: Right. 
22 MS. ZARAGOZA: I have like - I don't even want to 
23 • explain it to you -
24 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: No, they have -




j could go 
j see, all 
; and they 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 
out there too. 
get it for free 
you have to do 
11 give you an 
i you a doctor- It's not 
MS. ZARAGOZA: 
MR. ZARAGOZA: 
They have it for free. They have it 
They do. If I got out of here, I 
, baby. I know all about it. Y'ou -
is go down to Valley Mental Health, 
evaluation, and then they'll assign 
even a big deal. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
You know what I mean? I mean, I've 
learned that in here. I mean, I think - and then the Fourth 
Street Clinic. All that stuff is for free. The Fourth 
Street Clinic can refer you to - refer you to -
Well, I can look into that. 
You know, but I mean, I just -
I mean, to me - I mean, I get more 
11 
12 | MS. ZARAGOZA: 
13"| MR. ZARAGOZA: 
14 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: 
15 \ depressed -
16 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
17 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: I get more depression just worrying 
18 | about you -
19 ; MR. ZARAGOZA: Right, uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 j MS. ZARAGOZA: - and stuff, 
21 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Right. 
22 I MS. ZARAGOZA: - and I shouldn't even have to be. 
23 I MR. ZARAGOZA: I - and, baby, I agree with you. 
24 j MS. ZARAGOZA: You know, and it's - and, gosh, I 
25 ; can't even believe how bad it got - how bad it was. 
1 | MR. ZARAGOZA: Hey, you don't think that I do that, 
2 i the same, baby? 
3 ! MS. ZARAGOZA: I didn't say you didn't. I'm - you 
4 j know, I mean -
! 
5 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Well, I know. Mama. I didn't 
6 mean it that way. You know what I mean? I didn't mean it 
7 that way. I mean, I understand - I mean, I'm saying - what I 
8 mean is, I understand, because I'm in the same boat, you 
9 know? I worry all the time. I pray for you so much, because 
10 you know what? I know it's dangerous out there. There's 
11 : fricking drugs everywhere. There's all these people -
12 ' MS. ZARAGOZA: Right, and so like -
13 | MR. ZARAGOZA: - going in your ears. 
14 i MS. ZARAGOZA: - you're here. And then when all 
15 this shit's going on and then, you know, I can't even say it 
16 ; happened to you, because you're jumping my fucking ass. 
17 I MR. ZARAGOZA: When? 
18 ; MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, whenever I have something to 
19 I say or whatever. 
20 j MR. ZARAGOZA: Baby, you haven't -
21 i MS. ZARAGOZA: When I have a feeling or a feeling 
22 | or whatever you might not agree with, you don't want to 
i 
fucking hear the thought. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: When? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Just that's how you are. 
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ZARAGOZA: Or even if I am uptight or whatever-
ZARAGOZA: How? How am I like that? What do 
's how I am? When did I -
ZARAGOZA: I feel like I can never can tell you 
ZARAGOZA: Babe? 
ZARAGOZA: See, like right now. Right now, I'm 





ZARAGOZA: I'm listening to you. 
ZARAGOZA: - and you're like not agreeing with 
ZARAGOZA: Baby, I haven't -
MS. ZARAGOZA: You're not even -
MR. ZARAGOZA: •- said nothing. I said I 
understand. What are you -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, you just said, when have I? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: No, because you're telling me that 
and I'm asking you when lately, or - I mean, I don't get it. 
I thought -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, like last night. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Baby, -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Do you remember? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 





























1 and I asked you why you 
I were mad, and 
j you earlier, 
| MS. 
Because I asked -
I don't give a fuck. I just damn - ! 
No, I -
I fuck off everything. Whatever. 
Who said that? j 
You said. 
No, I didn't. 
Go ahead and get in my ass, you 
Yeah, because -
What else you got to get in my ass 
Because, baby, you were -
That's not necessary. 
Babe, all day you were mad at me. 
were mad at me. You even said you 
all day you were mad at me. Even when I called 
you were mad at me -
ZARAGOZA: 
! anything. And then wher 
Yeah, and I didn't want to say 
I spoke - finally did, that's what 
happened. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Babe because you were pissed. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Because I said what I felt -






















MS. ZARAGOZA: - and you didn't agree with it. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: No, you weren't saying what you had 
felt. You were pissed, and you were attacking. You weren't-
MS. ZARAGOZA: I was not attacking. How can I 
attack you when I'm telling you about my - how I'm feeling -
MR. ZARAGOZA: You didn't -
MS. ZARAGOZA: - or what I'm thinking. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: No, you said what you were thinking, 
but you didn't tell me - all I knew was you were mad. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: You think everybody's attacking you. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: No, I thought you were -
MS. ZARAGOZA: It doesn't even matter. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, what have you changed? You 
hung up on me. That's the same shit that used to happen 
before, babe. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: And -
MR. ZARAGOZA: I mean, so -
MS. ZARAGOZA: - that's not attacking you. That's-
MR. ZARAGOZA: - what -
MS. ZARAGOZA: - just like stopping it. I don't -
MR. ZARAGOZA: That's the same attitude that -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Of course, it hung up - 30 seconds. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? What did? Hello? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: (Inaudible). 
























You know? So -
I don't want it. 





I went in there -
Mine's the same attitude too. 
Yeah. 
Just like yours. 
No, baby. I'm not the same. 
Oh, whatever. 
Sweetheart, I'm not. 
Okay. 
I'm really not. I'm not, Babe. I'm 
not the same. You know, I apologized three times yesterday, 
because I said something wrong or whatever, right? I mean, 
so that doesn't mean anything, and you don't think that I'm 
catching stuff then, right? Okay, I said that was wrong. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I must be a fucking fool then. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: I must be just fucking straight out 
stupid -
MR. ZARAGOZA: No. I'm trying to -
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MS. ZARAGOZA: - cause obviously I don't fucking 
understand shit. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: My gosh, baby, why are you -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Because you're -
MR. ZARAGOZA: - being so -
MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm fucking mad. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Why are you -
MS. ZARAGOZA: I'm mad. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: What is up? I mean, you're just 
like wow. Come on. 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: You know, what happened to all the 
church, and God, and all that? What happened to all that? 
Did you just throw it out the window or - I mean, you don't 
really mean it, or what's going on, baby? Hey? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Nothing. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I mean, do you really mean that when 
you talk about that stuff, sweetheart? And then I mean, -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, -
MR. ZARAGOZA: - how long is it -
MS. ZARAGOZA: - do you really mean it? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: Fuckin' a, I mean it. Yes, I do 
mean it. You know, there - I mean, I don't spend any of my 
damn free time. I mean, every - I mean, I'm in every damn 
group you can possibly imagine in here. You know what I 
1 i mean? 
2 • MS. ZARAGOZA: So what if you were right here in 
3 I front of my face? What are you going to do? 
4 | MR. ZARAGOZA: What do you mean? 
5 \ MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, what would you do if you were 
6 here? 
7 •; MR. ZARAGOZA: I'd probably leave, cause I won't -
8 \ well, that's what I've been learning. You've just got to 
9 kind of break it up. You know what I mean? Take a time out. 
10 I So you've got to just - somebody's got to leave. You know 
11 what I mean, to avoid the conflict. So I'd probably just 
12 leave and try to come back later - maybe talk about it, you 
13 know? I mean, that's what I would try to do. 
14 MS. ZARAGOZA: I'd probably just grab the Bible and 
15 say something, let's pray, or something. 
16 MR. ZARAGOZA: Well, that would be good too. You 
17 know, I mean, if - I would like to try that first, you know? 
18 I'm just saying - I mean, you just ask me, and I'd just took 
19 like that off the top of my head, but just the same thing 
20 last night. I - when you first - you know, when I thought 
21 you were upset, I told you when we get off the phone, let's 
22 go pray, you know. Babe, listen to me. Do you know what, 
23 sweetheart -
24 MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
25 MR. ZARAGOZA: - I obviously know - I don't know if 
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somebody's talking in your ear, okay? 




No. baby, I could tell. 
No, you can't. You don't even know. 
Babe, you know what, you say that 
7 | Antonio - you brought up - you said people's names. 
And so what? 
So there -
What does that mean? 
So then you're talking to people. 
It doesn't even matter if - and 
Your - no. 
And you're not? 
No. 
You don't fuck - you know what. 
Who? 
Don't even fucking lie. 
Who in the hell am I talking to? 
You know what? See, that's how I 

































































MR. ZARAGOZA: Babe, why are you thinking that I am 
talking to people? 
Because -
What made you think that? 
- I know you, Jonathan. I know you. 
Oh, wow. 
God. 







am I going to talk to? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: You know, when you get pissed off at 
somebody, you know, I mean you're pissed. You know? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: You know what, you haven't - you 
haven't forgiven nothing, because you know what? You're 
still judging me like if I haven't tried to make any progress 
at all. You know, you don't believe anything that I say 
obviously then, right? Babe? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Well, I do. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I mean, because if you don't -
MS. ZARAGOZA: In some ways, but it just kind of 
freaks me out, cause I just want to make sure. You know what 
I mean? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: I know, and, you know, I'm not the 
one that -
MS. ZARAGOZA: If you say - I mean - well, look 
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ve got to 
MR. 
at, and, of course. 
say, and it's just 












MS. ZARAGOZA: You know, when you're here in front 
of my face, what's going to fucking happen? 
MR. ZARAGOZA: But you've got to think what 
happened? You know what I mean? You've got to think where 
I'm thinking. That you know - you've got - I'm trying to 
explain that to you. I mean, Babe, I fuckin' was dead. Do 
you understand that? You know I was - I mean, I will say it. 
I was probably in hell, you know, that when I came back to 
life. I mean, I probably was on ray way to hell. I don't 
know if you really understand how traumatizing that can be 
when you really think about it. If it happened to you and 
you really had a chance to really think about what happened 
to you. Do you understand what I'm saying? 
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: That is just - baby, it - you know 
what? I mean, I don't wish it would happened to everybody, 
but-
MS. ZARAGOZA: It happened to you and -
MR. ZARAGOZA: - it would be -
MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. 
MR. ZARAGOZA: It would be a good thing that if it 
37 
1 i happened to everybody, because they'd be in - their eyes 
2 | would be opened the same way mine were- I mean, I don't wish 
3 ; that would happen to anybody, because maybe they wouldn't 
4 \ come back. But you know what, baby, I am so thankful that I 
5 I didn't die like that. I mean, I am. I honestly am. I mean, 
6 ! you don't understand how thankful I am. I mean, I don't want 
7 | to -
8 i MS. ZARAGOZA: I know. I don't understand. I -
! 
9 | MR. ZARAGOZA: I don't want to go to hell. I 
10 i don't. 
11 j MS. ZARAGOZA: You know? You almost - yeah, you 
12 ; almost died, and you've been - and you went through all that. 
13 ; I know. It's hard. 
14 • MR. ZARAGOZA: And I don't want - I don't want to 
15 j go to hell. I don't. And you know what? And I know better, 
16 i and I've been blowing my whole life away, and I know better. 
17 ! You know? And why so hard headed? I don't know. And I ask 
18 i God, and I don't know why, you know? I have an idea. I 
19 : mean, you know, and if I had time, I'd love to one day sit 
20 ; down and talk to you about it and why I think that, you know, 
21 \ I had the thoughts and things in my head, and how I just 
22 ; viewed everything -
23 ; (Audio stopped) 
24 | MR. COOLEY: That's, unless, Your Honor and Mr. West 













MR. WEST: I couldn't hear you. 
MR. COOLEY: Unless you want to hear more of that, 
that's all that I'm interested in playing. 
And to be honest, with the exception of one call 
that consisted mostly of praying, those are the calls that I 
have listened to. 
Your Honor, I had Ms. Ayrapetova write this down 
for me. "Witness tampering is defined as 'an individual 
believing that an official proceeding, investigation or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted.'" I 
think we can all agree that Mr. Zaragoza at the time of all 
of these calls as well as the jail visits, was aware that an 
official proceeding was pending. 
"Kith the intent to prevent or with the intent to 
prevent an official proceeding or investigation. Attempt, to 
induce or otherwise cause another person to," and this is the 
second prong there, "withhold any testimony." 
The statute itself for witness tampering doesn't 
admit of any exception because the witness, or the other 
person that they're attempting to induce to withhold 
testimony is their spouse. It's not a factor. It's 
irrelevant, I would submit, under the statute itself to 
determine whether someone is guilty of witness tampering. 
The intent to induce someone to withhold testimony and any 
effort made on - or to induce that person to withhold the 
1 ; testimony, that's witness tampering. 
2 ] Couple of things that I would like to point out 
3 ; from the conversations, some of the specific statements the 
4 ! defendant makes. During the March 19t;i conversation, 
5 ! Christine asks if she should go or not. He tells her he 
6 i doesn't think it matters. They're not going to do anything. 
7 ' During that same conversation describing the, his 
8 • conversation there in court, he states loudly that they got 
9 nothing. Indicates that she's the entire case and without 
10 her we've got nothing. 
11 ; He also in that same conversation - and this is I 
12 : believe indicative of the larger broader scheme of 
13 manipulation, talks religion, tells her about a scripture 
14 that he's thinking about that says do not think of things in 
15 ; the past. 
16 ; During the February 16tn conversation, that was 
17 ; when Christine told him that the, they were looking for her 
18 ; too, referring to Angelina, because of their little dispute. 
19 ! He says, so she's, so they're in the same damn boat? And he 
20
 : tells Christine to tell Angelina just to, to avoid it all, 
21 ; just don't even fuckin' go. And that's it and it's done. 
22 Just tell her that. And Christine goes, oh, yeah, she knows, 
23 : she knows. 
24 ; This is again is four days after a hearing at which 
25 i Christine was personally served with a subpoena ordering her 
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to appear and she didn't go. During the second part of that 
2 | conversation, during the call, the second call that was 
3 j played, they discuss at some length the past between the two 
of them. Christine repeatedly expresses concerns about the 
5 | defendant's actual behavior. And he tells her she hasn't 
6 | forgiven anything. She says that he'll say whatever he's got 
7 | to because he's in jail. But when he's out, in front of her 
face, and this is when Christine asks, ""What's gonna fuckin' 
9 | happen then?" 
10 | And the defendant, goes on to, again, discuss 
11 j religion. Tells her he's worried about her. Repeatedly 
12 I tells her that he's working out his issues. 
13 I I think, I think its pretty clear that the 
defendant's, and I don't know whether he intends the symbols, 
15 j but God is about forgiveness. Religion is about second 
16 | chances. And that is what the defendant is asking her for. 
17 j I think Christine's statements during the last conversation 
that we listened to make it perfectly clear that Christine 
19 [ knows she is being manipulated. She asks about it because 
20 I she doesn't want to be manipulated. She wants, she wants the 
21 j defendant to be being honest. She recognizes that they have 
22 | a history which means that regardless of what he's saying 
23 | now, if and when he gets out, if they were having the 
24 j argument that they had had the night before, she wouldn't 
25 j feel safe. 
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1 j Defendant reassures her but she, I think, clearly 
i 
2 from the questions that she asks and the statements that she 
3 | makes as well as her tone of voice and her reactions to the 
4 defendant statements, she recognizes that she is being 
5 manipulated into accepting the defendant back, forgiving him 
6 and giving him a second chance. 
7 j And I think that that - witness tampering doesn't 
8 j mean that you have to kill the witness. It doesn't mean you 
9 | have to buy them a plane ticket to leave town, to leave the 
10 i country. It doesn't mean you have to bribe them. It means 
11 ' that you have to undertake some action to prevent them from 
12 testifying to cause them to withhold any testimony. And 
13 that's exactly what the defendant is doing. He's 
14 manipulating Christine into not providing testimony. 
15 Her decision, obviously, she has a right to do that 
16 just like she has, like I said before, a right to leave town. i 
17 But the defendant is actively participating in planning that. ! 
13 He's manipulating her into making decisions. Providing her j 
19 with the information, the constitutional provisions that she 
20 needs to quote in telling the Court this. And when she 
21 starts to suspect that this may be a scheme on his part just 
22 to get out of jail, he brings up God. He brings up religion. 
23 He tells her she's not forgiven him of anything. 
24 So I would submit that the emotional, the 
25 ; religious, the psychological manipulation in this case that, 
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that constitutes witness tampering. Above all of that, the 
defendant every time he called her had to do so in, violation 
of the no-contact order. 
And I would just note that the section of the Utah 
Code, the Co-Habitant Abuse Procedures Act which provides for 
the issuance of those no-contact orders, it also makes no 
exception for spouses. Those no-contact orders, it's 
irrelevant what the relationship is so long as they're co-
habitants - which means anything from the biological parent 
of the other party's unborn child, to roommates, to actual 
spouses. 
The code recognizes the danger of the witness 
tampering as well as recidivism, repeat violence, especially 
following acts of domestic violence and while other cases are 
pending. And that's exactly why that, the no-contact order 
provided for by code in domestic violence situation, domestic 
violence situations is to protect against exactly this sort 
of behavior. 
So I'll and I'll just submit it on that. 
MR. WEST: Your Honor, I can only say that Mr. 
Cooley and I view those conversations way differently from 
each other. And I too want to refer to some of the 
conversations. 
I want to go back to the issue as the Court framed 
it when we started this hearing. You said that the issue 
1 here is whether, whether Ms. Zaragoza's invocation of her 
2 ; privilege not to testify was due to a wrongful act of the 
3 •• defendant. And then you enumerated, did he pressure, did he 
4 I bribe her, did he use emotional manipulation. 
5 ; And these, my notes are kind of out of 
6 chronological order and unorganized, but in February 16th, 
7
 ; first conversation, Mr. Zaragoza encourages Christine to 
S : think about herself and to stay focused on God no matter what 
9 happens to him. And the second conversation, he encourages 
10 her to seek counseling. He tells her that, that he's, he's 
11 < getting some counseling in the jail. There was a reference 
12 to John, this fellow that he's been getting counseling from 
13 ; in jail. It's been kind of an awakening for Mr. Zaragoza 
14 . while he's been in jail for a long period of time.. Its first 
15 time he's realized some of the issues that, that he has. And 
16 : its been something that's helpful to him. Its been an 
17
 ; awakening for him. But when she says that she hasn't been 
18 getting counseling, he, he said he wishes she would. 
19 ' Now, I think everybody knows that by encouraging a 
20 i victim of domestic abuse to get counseling, that is not 
21 '• looking at, that's not Mr. Zaragoza looking out for his 
22 i interest. That's not him trying to get her to avoid process 
23 '• or to avoid participating in the case against him. 
24 ! He also indicated - and I'm not sure I noted the 
25 : date on this one, but he said that he's learning in groups 
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that he has to just leave when they were referring, this was 
one of the conversations when their voices were raised and 
they were arguing about incidents that had happened in the 
past. He said I just have to leave to take a time out. 
That's what I'm learning in here. He talked - he does talk 
about how he's changed because of some, some of the things 
that he's learned. 
But again, Mr. Cooley's argument is that you're 
damned if you do and you're damned if you don't. You know, 
whenever Mr. Zaragoza talks about religion, Mr. Cooley wants 
to say, Well, that's just manipulation. I'd submit to you 
that if you listen to all these conversations that religion 
has become something important in Mr. Zaragoza's life because 
he knows that he can't change by himself and that's why he's 
sought help from the counselor in the jail. That's why that 
he's been learning scriptures and so on. 
There's no - there's been no pressure. There's 
nowhere in any of these conversations where he says to her, 
you know, where he tells her what to do. I mean, she 
suggests, well, maybe I should right a letter, he says, sure, 
go ahead, do that. He, he, yeah, he advises her that she can 
seek legal counsel. But there's nowhere where he's telling 
her what to do. 
Emotional manipulation is blaming someone else, 
making them feel like its their fault. There's none of this 
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1 ! in the conversations that he's had with, that we've heard 
2 | about today. I, I cannot conceive of how asking forgiveness 
3 I and saying that a person is trying to change is emotional 
4 ! manipulation. The way, the classic way that people 
5 I manipulate others is to make them feel guilty for what they, 
6 j for something, make them feel like its their fault. That's 
7 j not anything that Mr. Zaragoza has done in these 
8 j conversations. 
9 ; I don't think that anything that the Court has 
10 • heard or seen today shows that there was a wrongful contact, 
11 i or a wrongful attempt to pressure, to bribe, or to otherwise 
12 ! get Ms. Zaragoza not to do it, not to testify. In fact, 
13 ; again, I just, (inaudible) the March 19lJ> conversation he 
14 | says, "I don't think they're gonna do anything whether you do 
15 i or don't." That's the opposite of pressure. He's not 
16 ; telling her what to do. He's saying, I don't think they're 
17 i gonna do anything whether you do or don't. Well, he's wrong 
18 | about that, but he's not telling her what to do. 
19 ; And, Your Honor, the State hasn't proved what it 
20 ! needs to prove in order to show forfeiture by wrongdoing and 
21 | I would ask the Court to so rule. 
22 \ MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I would first remind the 
23 ! Court that a preponderance of the evidence (inaudible). I 
24 I disagree with Mr. West's representation of the statements 













of them. The defendant did not ask Christine for 
forgiveness. When she seemed like she may not, she may be 
bringing her up the past, he accused her of not forgiving him 
and said, what happened? What happened to all the God? What 
happened to all the religion? 
He wasn't asking for forgiveness. It wasn't an 
apology. It was an accusation. She was doing wrong by not 
being forgiving, by bringing up the past and by being weary 
of what might happen to her when he gets out of jail, about 
being suspicious that maybe, just maybe, all of the 
counseling, all of the treatment, all of the scripture 
reading that the defendant has been doing in jail is not 
actually intended to or succeeding at changing his behavior. 
Maybe it's a rouse. Maybe it just isn't going to work. 
Your Honor, these two have been together for a 
couple of years. They've known each other. They've had these 
conversations before- There are, I don't remember, 270 phone 
calls on the CD that the witness brought today. I think just 
these few phone calls, they're referencing other phone calls. 
They, I think all three of them in tone, in content are 
generally similar. And I think that they've clearly 
established that there was a plan on the defendant's part to 
manipulate his wife into invoking her marital privilege, that 
he executed that plan using emotion, religion and the 
feelings that his wife still had for him, and that he was 
successful in doing so. 
The one other note that I would make is that in 
3 j Montague which I still believe is the, it's a Tenth Circuit 
4 j case which I believe is directly on point with this issue. 
5 j The victim invoked her marital privilege at trial and refused 
6 | to testify. She had testified at a grand jury proceeding 
7 ; previously which is not a preliminary hearing, is not an 
8 | adversarial hearing. And the question was whether her 
9 I testimony at that preliminary hearing should be admitted at 
10 | trial. And I think it should be noted that the court did not 
11 ' consider her testimony at the preliminary hearing. The 
12 I prosecution and the defense agreed on proffer that 
13 j (inaudible) I believe with respect to statements that the 
14 j daughter would make about-. 
15 | THE COURT: - (inaudible) grand jury proceeding? 
16 j MR. COOLEY: Sorry? 
17 j THE COURT: It was a grand jury proceeding, wasn't 
18 j it, in the federal court? They didn't have a prelim? 
19 ; MR. COOLEY: No, that's what I'm saying, sorry. 
20 | THE COURT: Right. 
21 j MR. COOLEY: Not an adversarial proceeding. 
22 j THE COURT: Right. 
23 j MR. COOLEY: So there hadn't been an opportunity to 
24 | cross-examine. So, but the question was whether her 
25 j testimony at grand jury proceeding should be admitted at 
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1 trial, and the court didn't consider her testimony at the 
2 | grand jury proceeding. Which means the court didn't consider 
3 • her saying, he told me if I changed my story I wouldn't get 
4 i in trouble. It didn't consider her saying anything about 
5 i those conversations. 
6 J The court considered the fact that her daughter 
7 | would have testified, if called at the evidentiary hearing on 
8 I the forfeiture issue, the daughter would have testified that 
9 | she was scared of the defendant. Evidence would have been 
10 i presented that she had visited the defendant. She solicited 
11 | this communication, this contact. She visited the defendant 
12 ! five times at the jail and there was a history of domestic 
13 j violence. And the court said, the district court said and 
14 | the circuit court clearly approved of this finding, that 
15 I based on the history, the fear and the five visits of which 
16 ; they knew absolutely nothing in terms of the conversation 
17 i that occurred between them, that the wife's willingness to 
18 ! testify on the one occasion and the invocation of the marital 
19 i privilege on the latter, on the second occasion at trial, 
20 ' that that evidence was sufficient to show that he had 
21 j procured her unavailability through wrongdoing - violation of 
22 I the no-contact order. 
23 I Your Honor, I, I think that this case is dissimilar 
24 1 only insofar as we do know the content of the conversations. 
25 | We do know the information the defendant provided. We do 
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1 know the manipulation that the defendant engaged in. The 
2 I statements that he made regarding the possible penalties with 
3 j respect to the crimes. Telling Christine to tell a friend to 
4 just not show up, that gets rid of it. Instructing Christine 
5 j to file an affidavit, to do so before the hearing, before the 
6 I final pretrial. 
So, I think that in this case what the Court has is 
a lot more evidence than the district court had in Montague -
9 | evidence of manipulation. Numerous, more violations of the 
10 j no-contact order than in Montague. And I think that the 
11 j victim's fear of the defendant is evidenced on occasion in 
12 I those recordings, especially that last one that we listened 
13 | to where she says, asks what would things be like if you 
weren't in jail where he could, just wanted to say whatever 
15 | he's got to to get out. If he were out in her fuckin' face, 
16 | what would be happening? 
17 ! THE COURT: I have to take a break just for like 
18 j five minutes, to make sure that my husband got his car, 
otherwise, we're gonna be in big trouble, or I'm gonna be in 
20 ; trouble. So, I'm gonna step off the bench just for a second 
21 i and then I'll come back and rule, okay. 
22 j And I, hold on, Mr. Zaragoza, you may need to use 
23 | the - I kind of figured (inaudible). 
24 j (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
I 








indicated that it was my understanding and interpretation of 
the Court's opinion in PooJe, the Court's opinion in Giles 
vs. California and the, my understanding of the concept of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing or the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. And as I was thinking about it and as I have 
been preparing for this hearing, I was of the impression that 
the, Ms. Zaragoza's decision to invoke the marital privilege 
must have been wrongfully brought to bear by Mr. Zaragoza. 
That in order to apply the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, in order to, let's see, in order to show that -
sorry, it's, I'm tired - the guarantee of confrontation is no 
guarantee at all if it is subject - the right to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is one of the most 
important rights that a criminal defendant has, as he 
prepares for trial, as he undertakes to defend at a trial. 
Obviously, a conviction based on not only unreliable, but 
non-confronted testimony goes against the very nature of our 
criminal justice system and why we allow evidence in and why 
we exclude it. 
However, that fundamental right as pointed out by 
not only this doctrine, but as recognized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Utah State Supreme Court, that right can be 
waived and it, based upon behavior, based upon actions, based 
upon wrongdoing by a criminal defendant. 


















believe that in order to apply the doctrine in this case, the 
State has to prove that the wrongful intent to pressure, to 
bribe, to encourage Ms. Zaragoza not to testify is linked to 
her indication of the marital privilege. To the extent that 
that is what makes her unavailable, obviously, that is a 
pertinent and an important factor. 
The fact that she is unavailable is what is the 
important point here. And therefore, I believe and I would 
find that the State must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that - let me read, read straight from the case 
that, "the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may not be 
employed to deny an accused his confrontation right absent 
evidence when committing the crime or other wrongdoing, the 
accused was motivated by the desire to prevent the witness 
from testifying against him at trial." 
In this case there has been a flood of evidence and 
tons of evidence given the fact that there were 276 phone 
calls made from the jail to Ms. Zaragoza. There were at 
least two visits that we know of at the jail by Ms. Zaragoza. 
That there, more than by a preponderance has it been proven 
that this defendant engaged in witness tampering to attempt 
to induce someone from withholding testimony, change 
somebody's testimony, influence the testimony that may be 
given at trial. 
I listened to, we all listened to the conversations 
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1 j together. We, we may disagree on exactly what was stated in 
2 j those conversations, but it is fairly clear to the Court 
3 j listening to those conversations that there were; there was 
plenty of influence; there was plenty of reminders of the 
past; there were offers of forgiveness; there were 
withdrawals of forgiveness; there was indication after 
indication that Mr. Zaragoza is changing, that he's trying to 
change, that he - frankly, I think he even admitted that he 
made some admissions in the statement that, "you know what I 
did" in this case. There was discussion about how he's going 
to change. There was the indication of God or a higher 
12 j power. There was discussion of the relationship. 
13 j That, those discussions and those instances of 
14 j witness tampering are a sufficient basis and are sufficient 
15 j evidence of wrongdoing on Mr. Zaragoza's part. I would find 
16 j based upon all the evidence that was provided today, based 
17 | upon my understanding of the case law and where and why and 
18 j how this doctrine should be applied is particularly 
19 j applicable to a case such as this where the only evidence, 
20 | not the only evidence, but the significant evidence of the 
21 j statements submit, is the testimony of Ms. Zaragoza, or the 
22 I victim, in this case. 
23 j One other point that I wanted to mention, and that 
24 | is in a situation like this where the victim or where the 
spouse has invoked the marital privilege, the whole purpose -
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1 : and we talked a lot about this - but the whole purpose of 
2 | that privilege is to protect the marital institution and to 
3 ! protect and not do a disservice to the marriage entity 
4 ; itself. 
5 ! In a case like this where the wife has, or it could 
6 ' be a husband for that matter, it doesn't matter, where the 
7 ; spouse has invoked the privilege and the evidence that is 
8 j going to be submitted at trial is, its not the testimony of 
9 I the spouse at trial. It is statements that were made before 
10 i the privilege was invoked. Statements that were made and 
11 ! that will be offered and given by a third person I think that 
12 : the privilege itself, the purpose of the privilege is 
13 . somewhat mitigated. 
14 ; There's a case State vs. Burden and I know it's a 
15 ; Washington case, Washington state case, but there's a quote 
16 that I think it's particularly appropriate to this situation. 
17 ; And the Washington Supreme Court stated, "the purpose of the 
18 testimonial privilege is to foster domestic harmony and 
19 • prevent discord. The privilege also reflects the natural 
20 repugnance of having one spouse testify against the other, 
21 and prevents the testifying spouse from having to choose 
22 between perjury, contempt of court or jeopardizing the 
23 marriage." 
24 "We find the latter two purposes will not be 
25 affected by allowing third-person testimony because the 
104 
spouse is not testifying in court. This is not a case where 
the prosecution called the. spouse to the stand. If the 
spouse had testified under those circumstances, the common 
law rule would have been violated. Here, however, we are one 
step removed from actual testimony. Therefore, there is no 
chance that we might be repulsed by a spouse actually 
testifying against his mate. Nor is there a chance that 
marital frictions will be aggravated for there is a 
convenient buffer of the third-person actually making the 
remarks." 
I know that goes very, against the very nature of 
the Sixth Amendment to the, both the U.S. Constitution and 
our State Constitution because of the right to confrontation. 
But when you wrap all of this together, I do believe that Mr. 
Zaragoza has given up his right to confront his spouse based 
upon his actions and based upon his tampering of her and her 
testimony. And I would allow the State to submit that 
evidence through the testimony of other individuals. 
Certainly, we do have to address the issue, the 
hearsay issue. And I agree with you, Mr. Cooley, that it is 
wrapped up together in the sense of - the reason for not 
allowing hearsay is because of the confrontation issues. And 
when the defendant by his actions has waived that right, it 
would serve no purpose to exclude the statements based upon 









So I'm finding - and you're set to go on trial on 
Monday with Judge Quinn - that Ms. Zaragoza is unavailable. 
Mr. Zaragoza has procured her unavailability, in part, by the 
witness tampering that he has engaged in and that the 
statements that she made to officer, I think, I believe its 
officers who responded on or about June 17^', 2009, are 
admissible at trial. 
MR. WEST: Couple of points of clarification. Your 
Honor. Let me just be assured that you're not basing the 
ruling on any substance of any calls that you didn't hear, 
take into evidence today-
THE COURT: (Inaudible)-
MR. WEST: - because you did refer to the numerous 
calls. And I don't think that, that you can make a finding 
based on those calls that they had anything to do with 
wrongdoing. I mean, obviously, there was a protective order. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WEST: But I mean as far as trying to persuade 
Ms. Zaragoza not to testify. 
THE COURT: Right. And I - thank you for that 
clarification. No, I am not making my finding based upon the 
substance of any of those calls that I was not able to listen 
to and that were not presented. 
I am, however, it is significant and I think it is 
a fact that is important, the number of phone calls that were 
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made from the jail to Ms. Zaragoza. 
MR. WEST: I understand. But Judge, I just want in 
terms of any record that, that we would be dealing with the 
4 | calls that were heard. 
5 ; And then the other question I had was about hearsay 
6 j objection which you already addressed. And clearly that, 
this is just limited to statements that Ms. Zaragoza has 
made? 
9 | THE COURT: Correct. 
10 j ' MR. WEST: Now-
11 THE COURT: - (inaudible) else? 
12 j MR. WEST: - is there, are there any other - because 
i 
13 j I'm not sure exactly what all Mr. Cooley intends to 
14 j introduce. I know there's an 1102 statement and I'm assuming 
15 j that you, that there are statements to police officers. Is 
16 [ there anything else that I need to be concerned about? 
17 | MR. COOLEY: The medical records would be the only 
18 j additional thing. There was-
19 j MR. WEST: Well, the medical records are a different 
20 ! sort of hearsay. 
21 ! MR. COOLEY: Right. 
22 j MR. WEST: I mean, I think has to-
23 | MR. COOLEY: - right-
24 ! MR. WEST: - you can't just introduce those. You've 
! 











MR. COOLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: To lay the foundation, yes. 
MR. COOLEY: I guess, I guess just to rephrase this, 
as far as her statements to the medical providers, the 
treating providers there at the hospital as well as the 
paramedics. 
MR. WEST: So you intend to call the providers? 
MR. COOLEY: Yes. 
MR. WEST: Okay. 
MR. COOLEY: At this point-
MR. WEST: - because I can't cross-examine a 
document. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. COOLEY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And that is, that is a different, that 
would be a different objection. And to the extent that some 
of those statements, there's other- there's other avenues-
MR. WEST: - other hearsay exceptions for statements 
made for purpose of diagnosis if that's where the Court's 
going, but still I need to be able to cross-examine the 
witness, not a piece of paper. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR- WEST: I've seen the piece of paper and I don't 
think that does it, so. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. WEST: Then I would just ask that Mr. Cooley be 
required to prepare an order just so we have an order for any 
purposes of appeal-
THE COURT: Can you do that? 
MR. WEST: This is a relatively new issue in the 
state of Utah, so I think that we need to have an order. 
7 ; THE COURT: The thing that I think would be helpful 
8 : is other, I understand it and I'm not asking you to do a full 
9 I fledged finding of facts and conclusions of law by Monday 
10 morning. But to help Judge Quinn who's going to be presiding 
11 over the trial, if you could do an order sort of setting 
12 ; forth your understanding of my ruling. 
13 And Mr. West, maybe you can help him (inaudible) 
14 and you can put that together together, put that together 
15 for Judge Quinn on Monday. 
16 '-. And then certainly, depending on what happens at 
17 : the trial, obviously, if there is a need for a full-blown 
18 | findings of fact and conclusions of law type order, then-
19 MR. WEST: Yeah, I'm not suggesting that that need 
20 to be done before trial. But if, if there's, if it turns out 
21 | that there's an appeal in the case, we would have to have a 
22 ; statement. 
23 : THE COURT: You would, you would want that, yes. 
24 • MR. COOLEY: So just a simple order? I've taken a 
25 : page and a half of notes (inaudible). I will write up an 
109 
order outlining that as, to the best of my understanding, 
email it to Mr. West and then presumably we, we'll be able to 
bring something on Monday morning (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, perfect. Thank you. 
5 I MR. COOLEY: And would, would Mr. West like me to 
6 j prepare a findings and conclusions that (inaudible) assuming 
there is a verdict not in his client's favor? 
MR. WEST: Right. I mean, I'm not asking that that 
9 happen before trial. 
10 MR. COOLEY: Okay. 
11 i MR. WEST: Yeah. 
12 ! THE COURT: And I think for trial purposes - would 
13 ; you submit findings (inaudible) - did you submit a proposed 
14 : jury instructions and? 
15 j MR. COOLEY: I did. Your Honor. There's one change-
16 ; THE COURT: - jury questions? 
17 | MR. COOLEY: - as well as a request for discovery 
18 that has been provided to Mr. West today. 
19 i THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. West it is now 
20 I (inaudible)- voir dire questions. I don't know how, Judge-
21 I MR. WEST: Your Honor, I provided my voir dire. I 
22 i didn't submit jury instructions yet. I anticipate that I may 
23 j submit one, I mean, its not going to be like a full set. I 
24 j may have one or two instructions just on specific issues of 
25 | law. It kind of depends on how things - what evidence comes 
110 
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THE COURT: And then I do, I'll put on the top your 
proposed voir dire questions. 
MR. WEST: So you did receive my voir dire? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WEST: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I'll put it on the top so that-
MR. WEST: Okay. 
MR. COOLEY: And then my proposed instructions, the 
elements instruction for aggravated kidnaping. I (inaudible) 
provided them to the Court and (inaudible). The changes that 
I made in ten as well as an additional instruction 
instructing the jury that I, (inaudible). 
THE COURT: That's (inaudible)? 
MR. COOLEY: Yes. (Inaudible) for aggravated 
kidnaping and definition instruction for aggravated kidnaping 
that accurately reflects the charge. And then the 
(inaudible) Mr. West would have any objection to that 
additional instruction just letting the jury, informing the 
jury that domestic violence, aggravated assault and domestic 
violence in the presence of a child is charged in the 
instructions (inaudible) information on both felonies. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. AYRAPETOVA: Your Honor, may we withdraw State's 
















THE COURT: Provided that you get another copy. 
MS. AYRAPETOVA: All right. 
THE COURT: For-
MS. AYRAPETOVA: - for your record. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. COOLEY: We'll get another copy for (inaudible). 
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J E F F R E Y WILLIAM H A L L (No. 7 B 7 D ) 
A T T D R N E Y AT LAW, 
A PROFESSIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
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ATTDRNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Th"d Judicial District 
FEB \ ? 20» 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, 
Defendant. 
ALLEGED VICTIM'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE AND MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES TO 
QUASH SUBPOENA AND OTHER 
RELIEF 
Case No. 091904897 
THE HONORABLE MICHELE M. 
CHRISTIANSEN, THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COMES NOW the alleged victim, Christine Zaragoza, by and through her counsel 
of record undersigned, and, pursuant to the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 
28(l)(a)(wherein the rights of a victim "to be treated with fairness, respect, and 
dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice 
process" are set forth); and, pursuant to Article I, Section 12, (wherein "a wife shall not 
be compelled to testify against her husband...") hereby asserts her privilege not to be 
compelled to testify against the Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, the alleged 
1 
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victim's husband in the above captioned matter. 
FACTS 
1. The Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, and the alleged victim, Christine 
Zaragoza, are husband and wife. See, Affidavit of Christine Zaragoza, attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1. 
2. The Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, has been charged by way of 
information of crime which has been publicly filed in court. 
3. On or about January 14, 2010, Christine Zaragoza was served with a subpoena 
issued by the Salt Lake County District Attorney commanding her to appear at trial on 
February 17, 2010 to provide testimony in trial against her husband, the Defendant, 
JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Ms. Zaragoza's privilege against testifying is constitutionally protected. 
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12, provides that "a wife shall not 
be compelled to testify against her husband..." Id. Because Ms. Zaragoza is the wife of 
the Defendant, she cannot be compelled to testify against the Defendant. She 
therefore asserts her privilege not to be compelled to testify against the Defendant, 
which privilege is constitutionally protected and guaranteed. 
2. Ms. Zaragoza's right to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice process necessitates guashing the subpoena. 
Because Ms. Zaragoza cannot be compelled to testify against the Defendant as 
set forth above, no good cause exists to subpoena her to trial. Indeed, subpoenaing a 
2 
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witness who cannot be compelled to testify serves only to harass and abuse the 
witness. Ms. Zaragoza's rights to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice process include her rights to be free from compulsory attendance at 
trial wherein she shall not testify. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Ms. Zaragoza respectfully moves this Honorable Court for relief 
sought; namely, to recognize the alleged victim's privilege as set forth above and enter 
an order quashing the subpoena, thereby relieving her from any duty or obligation to 
appear at trial in the above captioned matter. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 2010. 
/ S / ^whiQAX WiUiawi uLaAl 
JEFFREY WILLIAM HALL, 
A T T O R N E Y AT LAW, 
A T T D R N E Y F D R T H E D E F E N D A N T 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 11 day of 
February, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following: 
BRAD COOLEY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
111 E BROADWAY, STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
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To Whom It May Concern: February 11,2010 
I Christine Zaragoza am writing this letter in regards to the second subpoena I received 
on February 11 2010 requesting my presence as well as my daughter Erica Garcia on 
February 12th 2010 at 9:00am act Third District Court. I am honoring my husband and do 
not wish to testify against Jonathan E. Zaragoza. I am assisting my marital rights and 
wish to leave fate in Gods hands. 
Christine Zaragoza 
State of Utah 
8 
County of *7* H £*fc<-^) 
On this (I day of ffo*r>\ in the year 2*J£_, before me M*&fc**~> p r t n c c 
B S T - J • MONI'H * J TE*R—5- NO'lAKY PUBLIC NAME 
a notary public, personally appeared 
NAME OF UOCUMKKI'frfalfl 
proved on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) (is/are) 
subscribed to this instrument, and acknowledged (he/she/they) executed the same. Witness my 






NOVEMBER 23, 2013 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Your Honor, the other matter, given the Court's 
ruling that the case is not appropriately merged, I offered 
an instruction - should I just read it into the record or do 
you — 
THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you do that? That would 
make it clear which instruction you're talking about. 
MR. WEST: We offered the following instruction to 
allow the jury to consider the issue and that is, "You are 
instructed that the law does not allow double punishment for 
the same act. Accordingly, you may not find the defendant 
guilty of both a kidnaping charge and an assault charge 
unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any detention 
of Ms. Zaragoza was independent of and not merely incidental 
to any assault of Ms. Zaragoza. Accordingly, if you find 
that Mr. Zaragoza assaulted Ms. Zaragoza over a period of 
time, but that he did not detain or restrain her for any 
significant period of time, in addition to the time taken up 
by the assault, you may not find him guilty of kidnaping." 
THE COURT: All right. And is that your only 
exception to the proposed charge, Mr. West? 
MR. WEST: Yes, Your Honor. My understanding that 
in chambers the instruction with the additional elaboration 
of the definition of serious bodily injury is taken out, 
right? 
THE COURT: Correct. 
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UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS 
AMENDMENT 5 
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory 
USCS Const. Amend. 5 
THE CASE NOTES SEGMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO 8 DOCUMENTS. 
THIS IS PARTI. 
USE THE BROWSE FEATURE TO REVIEW THE OTHER PART(S). 
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and just compensation clauses. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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USCS Const. Amend. 6 
THE CASE NOTES SEGMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO 10 DOCUMENTS. 
THIS IS PARTI. 
USE THE BROWSE FEATURE TO REVIEW THE OTHER PART(S). 
Rights of the accused. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS 
AMENDMENT 14 
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory 
USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1 
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 2ND SPECIAL SESSION AND NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTON 
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*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 63 (11/16/2010); 2010 UT App 327 (11/18/2010) AND 
NOVEMBER 1,2010 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (2011) 
§7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
HISTORY: Const. 1896. 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 2ND SPECIAL SESSION AND NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTON 
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*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 63 (11/16/2010); 2010 UT App 327 (11/18/2010) AND 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Const. Art. I, §12 (2011) 
§12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited 
to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1. 
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 4. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2011) 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may 
be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both 
the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall 
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
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evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. 
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